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Abstract
Aggregating individual preferences into collective choices is a central issue of multia-
gent systems and voting is the most general method used. A voting rule (social choice
function) is a function that maps each preference profile to an element in the set of the al-
ternatives. The famous Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem asserts that all voting rules with
three or more candidates are manipulable in the sense that at least one of the voters can
improve the chances of getting a more favorable outcome by voting strategically (Gib-
bard, 1973, Satterthwaite, 1975). It is envisaged that manipulation is difficult or even
infeasible for a voting rule as the existence of such situations may lead to a socially un-
desirable candidate being elected. This thesis analytically measures the revised volumes
that represent the likelihood of individual manipulation under Plurality, Anti-plurality,
Borda Count and Single Transferable Vote in the context of three-candidate elections,
with the Impartial Anonymous Culture condition when preference profiles are normal-
ized. The results show that Anti-plurality is most susceptible to individual manipulation
while the most resistant rule to such a situation is Single Transferable Vote.
Keywords: Voting, Manipulation, Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, Single Transfer-
able Vote
JEL Classification: D71, D72
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Research focus
Voting has long been used as a tool for collective decision making, with Athenian democ-
racy known to have existed at least as far back as the 6th century BC (Menton and Singh,
2012). For just as long, attempts have been made by political parties and the public
to influence election outcomes. For example, when voters feel voting according to their
personal preferences induces an undesirable outcome, they vote strategically to sway the
outcome to achieve another viable option. A vote for a candidate that has no realistic
chance of winning the election might be considered as “wasted”. If a voter obtains a
more favorable outcome by means of strategic voting, she1 is said to be manipulating
the voting rule. This outcome might not be socially preferred and could lead to unpop-
ular and unintended changes in policy, the allocation of resources and even the political
direction of a society.
Two recent voting outcomes have highlighted the unpredictability and complexity
of a voting system. The UK’s referendum and its subsequent decision of exiting the
European Union, or the so-called Brexit was considered to have far-reaching consequences
for all areas of British society and the economy for years to come2 and the most recent
1For simplicity’s sake, we use “she” to refer to a voter, and “he” to refer to a candidate.
2Source:https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jul/22/one-month-on-what-is-the-
impact-of-the-brexit-vote-so-far, retrieved 13 August 2016
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election of Donald Trump for the US presidency is believed to have slid the country
into predictable chaos. The New York Times stated that “rarely in the history of the
American presidency has the exercise of choosing people to fill jobs had such a far-
reaching impact on the nature and priorities of an incoming administration.”3. People
are still perplexed at these unexpected outcomes and thus, it is important to comprehend
the voting system as well as the way people materialize their hopes in votes. This thesis
attempts to demystify one of the many complex aspects of elections.
Manipulation is fraught, not only in human elections but also in the world of artificial
intelligence and computer science because virtual elections have become a standard tool
in preference aggregation. Voting was first used in artificial intelligence to solve planning
problems, allowing agents to vote on the next step of the plan (Ephrati and Rosenschein,
1991). The web metasearch engine is another application of virtual elections where the
engine treats other search engines as voters and the web pages as candidates (Dwork
et al., 2001). Voting mechanisms are also used in the intersection of human societies
and the worlds of computer science to, say, build recommender systems for collaborative
filtering (Pennock et al., 2000). Since voting is commonly used and the consequences
of voting manipulation are dire, it is crucial that a voting rule should be able to resist
manipulation.
Extensive literature has addressed various facets of manipulation, and yet each result
seems only to deepen the mystery4. Different approaches have been adopted to study
manipulation of voting rules, ranging from the axiomatic to the concrete; from statistical,
analytic and computational approaches to topological ones (Saari, 1995). “Suffice it
to say for now that this conundrum has kept mathematicians, statisticians, political
scientists, and economists busy for two centuries - to no avail”5. The development of
3Source:http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/13/us/politics/donald-trump-administration-
appointments.html?ribbon-ad-idx=1&rref=homepage&module=Ribbon&version=origin&region=
Header&action=click&contentCollection=Home%20Page&pgtype=article, retrieved 13 November
2016
4Saari (1995) claims that it is possible to make every single candidate win an election if a “well-
designed” voting rule is applied.
5Szpiro (2010)
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mathematical field of game theory in 1940s and the use of Nash equilibrium to analyze
strategic voting have changed the voting theory field. One of the most cited results in
social choice theory, Arrow’s impossibility theorem, inspired further significant results
including the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem (Gibbard, 1973, Satterthwaite, 1975).
Rigorous study of voting manipulation dates back to the early 1970s when the philoso-
pher Allan Gibbard and the economist Mark Satterthwaite independently established the
theorem bearing their names (Taylor, 2005, Wallis, 2014). The theorem essentially states
that all non-dictatorship6 voting systems with more than two candidates are manipu-
lable in the sense that at least one of the voters can improve the chances of getting
a more favorable outcome by voting strategically. While the influence of game theory
was implied in Arrow’s impossibility theorem, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem proofs
explicitly treat voting rules as game-theoretic mechanisms, which provides the field of
voting theory with a set of tools to examine a whole range of possible scenarios (Menton
and Singh, 2012).
To circumvent the negative result stated in the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, re-
search has been conducted to check if finding a beneficial manipulation is computationally
infeasible. The computational complexity approach has achieved some success, showing
how hard it is to manipulate certain rules in the worst-case sense. However, computa-
tional difficulty does not preclude the existence of an efficient algorithm that can find a
successful manipulation, and thus a worst-case analysis may be insufficient to guarantee
the resistance to manipulation. This thesis departs from the computational approach,
attempting to analytically measure the individual manipulability of four voting rules:
Plurality, Anti-plurality, Borda Count and Single Transferable Vote (STV).
Voting manipulation is often classified according to the number of electors who at-
tempt to manipulate the outcome, the manipulators. If only one voter manipulates the
election outcome, it is called individual manipulation. If there is a group of people who
6Nondictatorial requires that no single voter should have the power to determine the outcome. In
the situation where one voter determines the result of an election, voting would be a waste of time.
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cooperate to manipulate the elections, it is called coalitional manipulation. Saari (1995)
names the types of manipulation with one or a small group of voters micromanipulation
while the type with a large group of voters is termed macromanipulation. To avoid am-
biguity between the small and large group, we follow the individual manipulation and
coalitional manipulation terminologies for the rest of the work.
The idea that an individual can change an election outcome might appear to be
unrealistic7 and what we attempt to measure is not the probability an individual can
manipulate the outcome either. In fact, the probability that any one person can manip-
ulate the election goes to zero in the limit when the number of voters goes to infinity.
What does not go to zero is the ratio of the probability of manipulability under one
voting rule to the probability of manipulability under another voting rule, which is what
we are trying to measure. This measurement allows us to compare the four rules in terms
of its vulnerability to individual manipulation.
1.2 Objectives
The thesis aims to obtain analytical results regarding the likelihood of successful in-
dividual manipulation in three-candidate elections under four voting rules: Plurality,
Anti-plurality, Borda Count and STV, from which the relative probabilities of each scor-
ing rule8 with STV are computed. To achieve this aim, we first compute the volumes of
regions representing possible individual manipulation Q by applying the decomposition
method. After that, the volume Q is adjusted by its angle with possible manipulation to
obtain the revised volume, which is interpreted as the likelihood of successful individual
7Saari (1990) argues that individual manipulation is easier to be justified compared to coalitional
one because it only requires few voters to know or suspect what the actual outcome under sincere
preferences is and decide to act strategically. Meanwhile, coalitional manipulation assumes wide-spread
prior knowledge of who the real competitors are. Also, a coordinator is needed to ensure the correct
number of voters casting the votes strategically. Often, manipulation means that a voter has to vote for
someone other than her first preference. It is arguable that these groups of people should try to increase
the number of sympathetic voters rather than voting strategically.
8Section 3.1.3 explains why Plurality, Anti-plurality and Borda Count belong to the scoring rule
class.
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manipulation.
The results enable us to compare and contrast voting rules, and find the one that is
least susceptible to individual manipulation. Not all voting rules are equally manipulable,
and profiles that offer strategic opportunities for one procedure do not necessarily offer
strategic opportunities for another. However, manipulative behavior should not be the
only decision rule in selecting a voting rule. Precautions are necessary, but extremes can
be counterproductive. It is unrealistic to adopt a method that ensures sincere voting but
severely distorts the voters’ true intentions.
Our approach has two main advantages over the existing methods. Firstly, we do not
have to worry about the effect of the electorate sizes on the results thanks to normalizing
the preference profile. Furthermore, the angle of region Q with possible manipulation
is taken into consideration, allowing the results to accurately reflect the likelihood of
successful individual manipulation under each voting scheme.
1.3 Outline of thesis
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the literature
regarding manipulation, focusing on the four voting rules of interest. To understand
these studies, we first introduce the assumptions most commonly used in the studies of
voting manipulation. Then we discuss some desirable properties of voting rules and the
measures of manipulability that have been proposed and studied. After that, each of
the four is examined. There is also a focus on special properties of Borda Count and
STV. We conclude with a discussion regarding each voting rule and a synthesis of results
related to manipulation.
Chapter 3 is the theoretical core of the thesis, defining the individual manipulation
as a linear programming problem and providing the methodology of computing such
measure of manipulability. We redefine each voting rule in mathematical form and set
up the basic framework from which the study of voting rule is converted into geometry.
5
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After that, the regions that represent individual manipulation are defined for each rule
with the description of how such manipulations are realized. Finally, the method for
computing the volume of convex region and the revised volume is clearly delineated.
In presenting the results of each voting rule, Chapter 4 starts with vertices and the
geometry of its faces, followed by the decomposition structure from which the volume is
computed, and then the computation of the angle of region Q with possible manipulation.
Because the computation of volume in high dimensional space is complex and error-prone,
a standard Mathematica code is designed to generate artificial data for consistency check.
The results are discussed with respect to the existing literature. Chapter 5 concludes
and proposes possible extensions for future research.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
The famous Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem asserts one of the main obstructions facing
the social choice field: all nondictatorial voting rules with three or more candidates
are manipulable. Since then, there has been extensive research attempting to measure
the manipulability of a voting rule and to find the voting rule that motivates sincere
voting while preserving as much desirable properties as possible. This review provides
the theoretical framework for each rule, which can then be utilized analytically in the
next chapter. We begin by examining the most commonly studied assumptions and the
justification for continuing research with such assumptions. After that, the four voting
rules: Plurality, Anti-plurality, Borda Count and STV are discussed in details.
2.1 Assumptions
Research on the probability of manipulation is often based on the assumptions that
voters might have different preference rankings over the set of candidates. The most
commonly-studied models are Impartial Culture (IC) and Impartial Anonymous Culture
(IAC). Although these assumptions are often criticized for not reflecting realistic voting
scenarios, an extensive amount of research based on these assumptions continues to be
considered in the literature. Thus, before discussing the relevance of such studies, we
first need to understand these assumptions and the significance of continuing using them
in literature.
7
2.1. ASSUMPTIONS
2.1.1 Impartial Culture
The IC assumption states that each possible preference ranking on the candidates is
equally likely to represent the preferences of a randomly selected voter. Apart from
assuming the preferences of any given voter are independent of those of the others, IC
requires that there is a perfect balance of the expected ranking position of all candidates.
In other words, no candidate has any advantage compared to other candidates in the
preference rankings of a randomly selected voter, they are equally likely to be in any
position in the preference ranking.
2.1.2 Impartial Anonymous Culture
The concept of IAC is based directly on the assumption that all voting situations are
equally likely to be observed. In other words, voting situations follow a uniform distribu-
tion. IAC produces an expected balance of preferences on pairs of candidates. However,
this balance only applies to voting situations with anonymous voters, not to a specific
individual voter. A commonly used feature of voting rules is anonymity which states
that the names of voters do not matter. With this property, the profile can be repre-
sented as voting situation where we list the numbers of voters for each possible rankings.
Thus, we only need to consider voting situations, not profiles for voting rules which are
anonymous.
There are valid arguments that support the use of IC and IAC in researching voting
manipulation (Gehrlein and Lepelley, 2012). Firstly, we can compare different voting
rules on the basis of relative impacts that manipulation can have on various voting situ-
ations. Secondly, by using such probability models to obtain closed-form representations,
it is possible to isolate the effects of different parameters on the probabilities. Lastly,
abandoning theoretical models to pursue empirical studies that are based only on the
voting results from regular elections can lead to new problems regarding the validity of
the results. For example, a minor change in a preference threshold parameter of the
8
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model may lead to very different rankings being obtained. In conclusion, it is clear that
the classic assumptions for producing probability representations of voting paradoxes do
have valid uses.
2.1.3 Poll assumption
Often, polls assist voters to ascertain if their most preferred candidate has any chance of
winning the election or they need to vote strategically. The poll assumption states that
voters whose most favorite candidate is not one of the two top candidates in a poll have
incentives to adjust their preferences to vote for the one of the top two that they prefer.
For this reason, those who do badly in polls may drop out before the election. The poll
assumption applies primarily to the last poll taken before an election, but candidates
frequently drop after earlier polls, knowing that their showing is not improving later.
The poll assumption is a rational justification for our research where we consider the
possibility that a single voter can change the election outcome. Often an election is
preceded by an informal count or poll. If a candidate does badly in polls, his supporters
may change their votes because they understand that this candidate has no realistic
chance of winning the election.
However, the opinion polls were largely proved to be wrong in the Brexit referendum
and the American presidential election. Polls mistakenly predicted that Britain would
vote to stay in the European Union in June and did not capture Republican loyalists
who initially vowed not to vote for Mr. Trump, but changed their minds in the voting
booth, leading to the biggest polling miss in the US presidential election in decades1.
Thus, we need to bear in mind the possibility that polls fail to reach enough of those
people who actually turn out to vote.
1Source:http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/09/business/media/media-trump-
clinton.html?action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=span-abc-
region&region=span-abc-region&WT.nav=span-abc-region, retrieved 12 Nov 2016.
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2.1.4 Other assumptions
In this paper, the strategic behavior is considered decision-theoretic when individuals
act optimally while assuming that others in the electorate will vote sincerely and every
voter has a preference list that remains fixed throughout the voting process. We also
assume that the manipulator has perfect knowledge regarding the remaining votes. This
assumption is developed from the fact that if manipulation is hard in the most favorable
condition for the manipulators, then it must be hard in more realistic settings.
2.2 Properties
2.2.1 Monotonicity
The monotonicity or “nonnegative responsiveness” property states that an individual
cannot harm an alternative’s chance of winning by ranking him higher. For example, if
A is socially preferred to B, then an individual cannot harm A’s aggregate position by
ranking A above B in her ordering, with all other individual orderings held constant.
2.2.2 Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
The independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property implies that individual pref-
erences for any pair of alternatives should not be influenced by other alternatives. These
other alternatives can either be new alternatives introduced into the election or just the
switching ranking of other existing candidates. If the election, for instance, determines
that A is socially preferred to B, and suppose some electors change their preference lists.
If no voter changes the relative positions of A and B (i.e. those who initially ranked A
above B still do so, and those who preferred B to A continue to do so), then the voting
rule should continue to select A over B.
Menton and Singh (2012) claim that IIA and the possibility of strategic behavior are
mutually exclusive, meaning that the presence of one in a voting rule implies the absence
10
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of the other. However, we will see that this is not always true, particularly in the case
of Borda Count in Section 2.6.2.
2.3 Measures of Manipulability
Various indices of manipulability of voting rules have been introduced and studied. While
some measures such as computational complexity and axiomatic approaches can be used
to evaluate both individual and coalitional manipulation, others are only suitable for
coalitional manipulation; one such example is identifying the coalition size needed for a
manipulation to be successful.
2.3.1 Computational complexity
Many researchers have pursued the computational complexity direction pioneered by
Bartholdi III and Orlin (1991). The idea is to use the potential amount of time required
to compute the solution to a manipulation problem as the criterion. If the amount of time
required is a polynomial function of the problem’s size, then the problem is tractable or
nondeterministic polynomial time (NP) and it is easy to find an effective manipulation.
The hardest problems are classified as NP-complete and if a voting rule is NP-complete,
it is computationally resistant to manipulation.
Although software agents follow the algorithms coded without emotion rather than
behaving like human beings, they have all the patience and computing power necessary
to perform a complicated analysis (Conitzer et al., 2007). Also, they are not bound by
moral obligation or social pressure to act honestly, which enlarges the space of viable
votes or viable manipulation and hence, maximizes their chance of finding the optimal
solution (Faliszewski and Procaccia, 2010). Therefore, if the software agents cannot find
an effective manipulation, we can conclude that the voting rule is immune to strategic
voting.
Using computational complexity as a shield against manipulation has advantages over
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other methods, including restricting the voters’ preferences to be single-peaked and in-
troducing randomness in the elections. Often, social planning authorities cannot be sure
if voters’ preferences are single-peaked or not. Furthermore, the introduction of random-
ness would create too much noise and even make an election manipulable when it was
not under deterministic situations (Conitzer et al., 2007).
However, the computational barrier approach has recently been criticized because it
relies on NP-completeness as an indicator of computational complexity Walsh (2010).
The issue is that NP-completeness is only a worst-case notion. The fact that a problem
is NP-complete simply means that there exist some instances, not necessary all, that
are difficult to manipulate. In other words, the difficulty in constructing an efficient
algorithm that always find a beneficial manipulation does not guarantee the nonexistence
of an algorithm that often finds a successful manipulation. To guarantee a voting rule
to be immune to manipulation, we want to make all the possible instances hard to
manipulate. Thus, the conclusion about the (non)existence of voting rules that are
usually hard to manipulate using the computational complexity approach is yet to be
drawn.
2.3.2 The axiomatic approach
Since computational complexity is a worst-case analysis which may not sufficiently guar-
antee the resistance to manipulation, some authors take the axiomatic approach, showing
that voting rules satisfying certain axioms are usually manipulable by a trivial algorithm.
Conitzer and Sandholm (2006) are the first to take this approach. They show that com-
mon voting rules satisfy weak monotonicity and allow the manipulators to make either
of exactly two candidates win. In addition, they argue that it is impossible to design a
rule that both satisfies these two properties and resists manipulation at the same time.
Without imposing restrictions on a voting rule, Friedgut et al. (2008) show that an
entirely random manipulation may succeed with nonnegligible probability. Under the
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IAC assumption with exactly three candidates and a voting rule that has an outcome
independent of the names of the candidates, if a randomized algorithm succeeds with
only negligible probability, then the voting rule must be very close to being dictatorial.
Although the result only holds for a restricted number of candidates, it covers every
reasonable voting rule.
Xia and Conitzer (2008) extend the results of Friedgut et al. (2008) and obtain sim-
ilar conclusion that holds for any constant number of candidates. However, there are
additional conditions that the rules need to satisfy including homogeneity, anonymity,
non-imposition and canceling-out conditions. It has been shown that both the positional
scoring rule and STV do satisfy these conditions; thus, there exists at least a voter such
that a random manipulation for that voter will succeed with a nonnegligible probability.
Isaksson et al. (2012) successfully extend the result to settings with an arbitrary number
of voters and at least four candidates.
2.3.3 Other measures of manipulability
The vulnerability of a voting scheme can be measured by counting the opportunities for
manipulation or the number of candidates who can be made to win by manipulation
(Chamberlin, 1985). Both the number of voters who can individually manipulate the
elections and the Nitzan-Kelly’s (NK) index, which is the share of all manipulable voting
situations, have also been used to compare the manipulability of voting rules (Aleskerov
et al., 2015).
Saari (1995) notes that for individual manipulation to be successful, both the manip-
ulated and sincere profiles should be very close from two sides to the profile boundary
separating these outcomes. Two factors deciding if the manipulation would be successful
are the choice of the voting rule and the abundance of opportunities for a successful
manipulation. Strategic voting is not always used because the outcome depends on the
manipulator’s prior knowledge or expectation about the sincere election outcome.
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Reyhani et al. (2010) propose a new probabilistic measure of manipulability in the
case of coalition manipulation, acknowledging the limitations of two existing probabilistic
measures of manipulability. The logical possibility of manipulation fails to measure the
effort needed to gather and coordinate a coalition manipulation. There exist situations
where two voting rules have the same logical probabilities, but one requires much more
effort than the other does. The other measure that counts the necessary number of
manipulators becomes defective when certain situations are not manipulable by any
coalition. In addition, between two voting rules which requires the same number of
manipulators, one might be more susceptible to manipulation than the other in some
certain circumstances. The new probabilistic measure is suggested to reflect both the
size and the prevalence of the coalition manipulation. Reyhani et al. (2010) define this
measure as the minimum number of random agents that a potential instigator has to
interview to get enough agents for a successful coalitional manipulation. The underlying
assumption is that although the opinion distribution is known, the potential instigator
does not know which agent holds which opinion and thus, has to interview them one by
one.
Diss (2015) introduces the notions of self-selectivity and stability to examine the
manipulability of Borda, Copeland and Plurality rules with three candidates. A voting
rule is self-selective at some profiles if, given those profiles, there are no alternative rules
that beat the given voting rule if the given voting rule is used to choose among the
rules in the set. In this context, manipulability is understood as the possibility that a
given voting rule become non-selective after manipulation. In addition, a set of voting
rules is weakly stable if it always contains at least one self-selective rule at any profile or
voting situation. In this case, if none of the voting rules in the set is self-selective, the
society is not able to vote on how to vote. Diss (2015) concludes that the probability of
individual and coalitional manipulations tend to vanish significantly when the notions of
self-selectivity and stability are introduced.
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Arribillaga and Masso´ (2016) identify three necessary and sufficient conditions that
provide a systematic way to compare non-constant and non-dictatorial generalized me-
dian voter schemes in terms of their vulnerability to manipulation. The sets of manip-
ulable preferences for each voting rules are used as the criterion while the possibility of
incomparable pairs of social choice functions is not precluded. The authors note that ex-
isting literature has not distinguished the situation when only one manipulable instance
is possible from the case when many such instances exist. In other words, manipulability
of a social choice function does not indicate the degree of its lack of strategy-proofness
but merely states that the social choice function is manipulable. The approach of ap-
plying a median voter scheme to the universal domain turns out to be relevant if agents
have additional preferences on top of single-peaked preferences. The author concludes
whether or not a strategy-proof median voter scheme (on the domain of single-peaked
preferences) becomes manipulable on the universal domain depends very much on the
identity of the agent, the particular properties of the additional preference, and the
median voter scheme under consideration.
In the following sections, we will go into details for each voting rule. We provide
the definition and an example how the voting rule works, special properties, how an
individual can manipulate the election outcome in each voting rules and synthesize the
results related to manipulation from existing literature.
2.4 Plurality
Plurality is the most common form of the electoral system, used for local and national
elections in 43 of the 193 countries of the United Nations2. Plurality voting is particu-
larly prevalent in the United Kingdom and former British colonies, including the United
States, Canada, and India.
2Source: http://aceproject.org/epic-en/CDMap?question=ES, retrieved 2 August 2016.
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2.4.1 Definition
The Plurality3 selects the candidate with the most votes. Each voter casts vote for
one of the alternatives and the winner is the alternative with the most votes. This
makes Plurality the simplest voting system for voters and vote counting officials although
drawing the district boundary lines can be a contentious issue. Plurality ballots (or
single-mark ballots) can be categorized into two forms: either a blank ballot where the
name of a candidate can be hand written or a more structured ballot that lists all the
candidates and allows a mark to be made next to the name of a single candidate. A
structured ballot can also include space for a write-in candidate.
Example 1. Three candidates A,B,C running in an election with 100 votes under
Plurality scheme. If A received 40 first-place votes and while B and C each got 30, then
A would be elected under Plurality.
The problem with the Plurality method is that it might select an unpopular candidate
for the majority of voters (Wallis, 2014). In the example above, all the supporters of B
and C thought that these two candidates were better-qualified than A. The problem of
selecting an unpopular candidate is magnified when the number of candidates increases.
Voters often believe that the Plurality elects the wrong candidate.
In the countries with two major political parties, to overcome this dilemma, it is
common for each party to nominate one candidate representing the party. For example,
in the United States, a primary election is held to select the party nominee if there
are two or more members of a party wish to run for an election. The Democratic and
Republican nominees then compete in the national election. This method, however, will
not solve the problems if there are several major parties.
3It is also known as first-past-the-post in a system based on single-member districts or winner-takes-
all in a system based on multi-member districts
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2.4.2 Manipulation
If voters vote sincerely, they should cast their vote only for their most preferred alter-
native. However, while we know that no voting rule is completely immune to strategic
behavior, Plurality has been shown to be particularly susceptible, both in theory and
in practice (Saari, 1990, Forsythe et al., 1996). A voter opts to vote for one of the two
candidates she predicts is most likely to win, even if her true preference is neither be-
cause a vote for any other candidate will likely to be wasted and have no impact on the
final result. Also, with the number of strategies equal to the number of alternatives,
players can compute their best strategy easily, enabling them to vote strategically in a
straightforward way.
A striking example was the US presidential election in 2000. The presence of Ralph
Nader on the ballot swung the election from Al Gore to George W. Bush. If Ralph
Nander had not run, Al Gore would have won Florida and the national election because
the majority of Nader voters would have chosen Gore over Bush. This creates the
dilemma “people should afford to vote sincerely only when their votes do not matter”4
(Dixit and Nalebuff, 2008). If the election would be won by Bush whether a voter votes
or not, then she might vote sincerely with her heart. If her vote counts (breaking a
tie), then voting for Nader is a missed opportunity. In other words, a voter should vote
strategically if she is a pivotal voter. We would like people who genuinely prefer Ralph
Nader to have a way to express that view without having to give up their vote in Bush
versus Gore but there seems no way that Plurality can allow voters to do so.
Numerous studies have reached the same conclusion about the vulnerability of Plu-
rality to manipulation. Saari (2001) argues that Plurality is further away from symme-
try, and thus provide more strategic opportunities. Hemaspaandra and Hemaspaandra
(2007) produce one of the most beautiful results regarding the complexity of manipu-
lation, named “the dichotomy theorem” that classifies the complexity of manipulation
4In the context where American politicians are calling everyone to vote, it is better to say each vote
contributes to the final outcome.
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in scoring rules. They state that every scoring rule having two or more point values
assigned to candidates other than the favorite, except Plurality and its various guises, is
NP-complete to manipulate.
The relationship between the degree of manipulability and the size of the electorate
as well as the number of candidates has been extensively studied for Plurality. Aleskerov
et al. (2015) estimate the level of manipulability of 7 aggregation procedures: Plurality,
Approval, Borda’s, Black’s, Hare’s, Nanson’s and Threshold under both IC and IAC
assumptions. Using Nitzan-Kelly’s (NK) index, the authors find that for the case of 3
candidates with up to 10000 voters, Plurality is the worst aggregation procedure con-
cerning manipulability for both IC and IAC. Furthermore, for all voting rules including
Plurality, the degree of manipulability decreases with the size of the electorates because
as we consider individual manipulability, the weight of one’s preferences and its influence
are decreasing with the growing number of voters. This finding is consistent with Smith
(1999) which states that the manipulability index rises monotonically with increasing
number of electors, peaking when the number of voters is between 10 and 20. However,
Huang and Chua (2000) find the vulnerability of Plurality to be increasing as the size
of the electorate increases in multiples of 12. Furthermore, Smith (1999) also conclude
that when the size of the electorate is fixed, manipulability indices rise monotonically
with an increasing number of candidates.
Meir et al. (2010) apply the game-theoretic solution concepts to voting games, study-
ing the conditions under which Plurality voters’ strategic behavior converges to a deci-
sion from which no voter want to deviate (Nash equilibrium). They assume the scenarios
where voters have no initial knowledge regarding the preferences of the others and cannot
coordinate their actions. It is found that the convergence depends on the features of the
game such as the tie-breaking scheme and on the assumption regarding agents’ weights
and strategies.
Conitzer et al. (2007) focus on the computational complexity of voting rules when
the number of candidates is small, and there is uncertainty about the other’s votes.
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They study not only whether a voting rule is hard to manipulate but also the number of
candidates needed for the hardness to occur for both constructive manipulation (making
a given candidate win) and destructive manipulation (making a given candidate not win).
The authors find that both constructively and destructively manipulating the outcome
under Plurality are easy with any number of candidates.
While agreeing that Plurality is the most manipulable, Bassi (2015) notes some exper-
imental findings in favor of Plurality. This voting system yields not only more optimal
behavior in the sense that players are more likely to play the equilibrium strategy, but
also a higher level of social efficiency. Furthermore, Plurality never elects a Condorcet
loser although it reduces the frequency of electing the Condorcet alternative.
2.5 Anti-plurality
Anti-plurality is a member of the scoring voting family. Anti-plurality has not been used
for national election anywhere, although it is often used on a personnel committee (Saari,
2001).
2.5.1 Definition
The Anti-plurality rule selects the candidate with the least last-place rankings. Saari
(1995) introduces Anti-plurality as a kinder and gentler way of identifying the bottom-
ranked candidate where voters are instructed to vote for all but one candidate. An
alternative, equivalent approach that we follow in this thesis is to understand Anti-
plurality as a procedure that asks each voter to vote against one candidate. The following
example illustrates how this voting rule operates.
Example 2. Three candidates A,B,C running in an election with 100 votes under Anti-
plurality scheme. If A received 40 last-place votes and while B and C each got 30 and
50, then B would be elected under Anti-plurality.
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2.5.2 Manipulation
According to Saari (1995), individual manipulability depends on how many profiles are
near the boundary. Thus, a smaller boundary allows fewer chances of manipulation. The
more symmetric the procedure is, the minimal boundary areas are and thus, the minimal
exposure of opportunities to be successfully manipulated is. Saari (2001) constructs the
“procedure line” with normalized outcomes as endpoints. Each point on this line is the
profile’s election outcome for some positional methods. The profile allows each candidate
to be the winner with an appropriate way to tally the ballots, alerting the danger of
electing the wrong candidate if an inappropriate voting method is to be applied. It is
proven that Anti-plurality rule is further away from symmetry, and hence, provide more
strategic opportunities.
Inferring from studies of a more general class of voting rules, individual manipulation
under Anti-plurality is relatively easy. Friedgut et al. (2008) find that for nondictatorial
neutral 5 voting rules with three candidates, a random manipulation by a single random
voter will succeed with nonnegligible probability. Hemaspaandra and Hemaspaandra
(2007) claim that for Plurality voting’s transparently disguised translations including
Anti-plurality, weighted manipulation can be done in polynomial time.
Furthermore, the vulnerability of Anti-plurality is found to accelerate with the size
of the electorate. Huang and Chua (2000) provide an analytical characterization of the
vulnerability properties of four scoring rules: Plurality, Anti-plurality, Plurality with
runoff 6 and Anti-plurality with runoff 7. The authors also find that the non-sequential
mechanisms (Plurality and Anti-plurality) are more susceptible to manipulability than
their sequential counterparts.
Coalitional manipulation is often shown to be hard under Anti-plurality. Xia et al.
5A social choice function is neutral if it is invariant under changes made to the names of the alter-
natives.
6In the absence of a majority winner, Plurality with runoff selects the two top scorers from the first
round for the runoff. The winner of the runoff is the social choice.
7Anti-plurality with runoff sequentially eliminates the candidate with the most last-place rankings,
and the ultimate survivor of the process is the social choice.
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(2010) show that coalitional manipulation remains NP-complete for scoring rules even
when votes are unweighted. Conitzer et al. (2007) find that the constructive coalitional
weighted manipulation starts becoming NP-complete for Anti-plurality when the number
of candidates is three. Meanwhile, Reyhani et al. (2010) note that although Anti-plurality
is less susceptible to manipulation compared to Plurality and Borda count under IC, it
often requires smaller coalitions in the situations where it is manipulable, and finding
such coalitions is relatively easy.
2.6 Borda Count
Borda Count is a classic voting system which was named after the French mathematician
and engineer Jean-Charles de Borda who devised the system in the 18th century. Borda
Count was proposed to cure one of the major problems in Plurality where the candidate
with the most votes might be the unpopular one for the majority of voters. Borda
Count, often described as a consensus-based voting system, is believed to better reflect
the wishes of the electorate when more than two candidates are running for the election.
Borda Count has a rich and varied history of real-world use (Menton and Singh, 2012).
Nauru uses Borda Count to elect members of the Parliament, and Kiribati uses Borda
Count for selecting presidential election candidates. Borda Count has also been used to
elect two ethnic minority members of the National Assembly of Slovenia and throughout
the world by various private organizations and competitions (Davies et al., 2011).
2.6.1 Definition
The winner under Borda Count is the candidate with the most points where a specific
point is given for each ranking that voters rank over candidates. The following example
demonstrates the process of finding Borda Count winner.
Example 3. Consider three candidates election with 14 votes and the ranking as follow:
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6 6 2
A B C
B A A
C C B
If 1, 1
2
and 0 points are given to the first, second and third ranked candidates, respectively,
then the total points for three candidates A,B,C will be 10, 9, 2, respectively; hence, A
is elected under Borda Count.
There exist different versions of Borda Count depending on the flexibility of prefer-
ences listed on the ballots. The simplest way is to allow voters to rank as many candidates
as they wish, leaving all unranked candidate the minimum number of points. In some
places like Nauru, voters are obliged to rank all candidates.
2.6.2 Properties
Borda Count does not always satisfy the IIA property, even in a small electorate (Wallis,
2014, Mas-Colell et al., 1995). The reason is that the rank of a candidate depends on
the placement of all other candidates.
Continuing with the example above but assume that the two voters who had prefer-
ences C  A  B decided that B was a better candidate, the profile would be:
6 6 2
A B B
B A A
C C C
In this case, B would be the winner with 11 points compared to A with 10 points and C
with 0 points. No voter changed their preference ordering of A and B but the electorate’s
order of those two candidates has changed.
2.6.3 Manipulation
Borda Count used to be criticized when it was first introduced such that Jean-Charles
de Borda has famously dismissed criticism of his system’s vulnerability to manipulation
22
2.6. BORDA COUNT
by saying “My scheme is only intended for honest men”.
Computational complexity and experimental approaches suggest that Borda Count
is particularly vulnerable to individual manipulation (Bartholdi III et al., 1989). Smith
(1999) finds that Borda Count is especially manipulable if the manipulator has complete
knowledge of the others. Betzler et al. (2011) and Davies et al. (2011) show that Borda
Count manipulation is NP-complete even in the case of three votes and two additional
manipulators. Kim and Roush (1996) prove that Borda Count becomes coalitionally
manipulable with probability 1 when the number of voters tends to infinity. Bassi (2015)
experimentally studies behavior of electors under three voting systems: Plurality, Ap-
proval and Borda Count, finding that voters depart from their sincere strategy most
under Borda Count, without playing the best response strategy.
Other measures of manipulability also suggest that Borda Count is especially manip-
ulable. Chamberlin (1985) uses data generated through Monte Carlo simulation to study
four voting rules: Borda Count, Coombs, Hare, and Plurality of four candidates under
different electorate sizes. The author finds that Borda Count has the highest percentage
election in which manipulation is logically possible. In other words, Borda Count is most
frequently manipulable compared to the other three voting rules, with a large number
of manipulable cases. Although Borda Count turns out to be less manipulable than
Plurality when the number of candidates for whom manipulation is possible is used as
the criterion, it is still the most manipulable voting rule among the four when combining
the logical possibility and coalition size standards.
Favardin et al. (2002) characterize the conditions under which manipulation can occur
with Borda Count and Copeland in three-candidate elections, deriving a closed-form
representation of manipulability. The authors find that, under the IAC assumption, the
Borda Count rule is more vulnerable to individual manipulations compared to Copeland
though there also exists situation at which Copeland is manipulable but not Borda Count.
Tie-breaking rules have a significant impact on the results, with the probability of a tied
election tending to zero when the number of voters becomes large for Borda Count, but
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not for Copeland. If the tie-breaking rule changes from alphabetic order to random, the
results for Borda Count would modify marginally while the vulnerability to strategic
manipulation of Copeland could reduce significantly. Although Copeland suffers from
no-show or abstention paradox, whereas the Borda Count (and all scoring rules) are
immune, this does not change the conclusion. The reason is that voting situations which
may lead to a no-show paradox have already been counted as manipulable situations.
Gehrlein and Lepelley (2004) claim that the theoretical probabilities of voting para-
doxes cannot be considered completely negligible. With the assumption of IAC, the
Borda Count rule is vulnerable to strategic manipulation by coalitions of voters in 50%
of the preference profiles. However, the authors also note that these probabilities, com-
puted under the classic assumptions, should not be interpreted as an estimate of what
might happen in actual voting situations. Regarding the comparison of alternative voting
rules, the vulnerability of Borda Count to coalitional manipulation in three-candidate
elections with the IAC assumption is about 4.5 times higher than that of Plurality rule
elimination. Although the relative results offer useful insights in the choice of voting
rules, one needs to be cautious in examining if the results remain valid when relaxing
the IAC assumptions.
With regards to the number of candidates needed to make manipulation infeasible,
Conitzer et al. (2007) find that the constructive coalitional weighted manipulation starts
becoming NP-complete when the number of candidates is three for Borda Count. In
addition, constructive individual unweighted manipulation under uncertainty is also NP-
complete even with three candidates. However, destructive manipulation can be done in
polynomial time with any number of candidates.
Although many studies have concluded that Borda Count is one of the most vulner-
able voting rules for both individual and coalitional manipulation, Pritchard and Slinko
(2006) find Borda Count the optimal scoring rules, with the maximized asymptotic aver-
age threshold coalition size when the number of candidates equal to 3 or 4. Furthermore,
Borda Count turns out to be one of the least vulnerable when the possibility of indi-
24
2.7. SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE
vidual reactions or counter-coalitions of homogeneous voters is considered. Favardin
and Lepelley (2006) consider manipulability when taking into account the possibility of
reactions or counter-threats under IAC. They find that the possibility of reactions or
counter-threats significantly reduces the manipulability measures of Borda Count.
2.7 Single Transferable Vote
The STV has had an unusual place in the echelons of electoral systems, being one of the
oldest, yet rarest, proportional representation systems in use (Farrell and Katz, 2014).
STV was part of the by-laws of the Society for Literary and Scientific Improvement
of Birmingham in 18198, and was used in the Adelaide City Council election in 19849.
Research evidence suggests the STV began to be used again in the first part of the 20th
century, possibly because it was relatively difficult to implement this method before the
advent of computers and technology. STV was adopted for electing the Tasmania lower
house in 1907 and for electing the Australian Senate in 1949. Britain introduced STV
to Ireland in 1920 and Malta in 1921. These two countries continue to use STV in their
presidential elections after gaining independence (Farrell and Katz, 2014).
Although STV is used in local elections or at the organizational level in various places
including New Zealand, the International Olympic Committee and American Political
Science Association (Walsh, 2010), it has only been studied extensively in Australia,
Ireland, and Malta, where it is used for national parliamentary elections. The fact that
all three countries are former British colonies is not a coincidence: Britain had a tendency
to experiment STV on its colonies (Farrell et al., 2016). The retention of STV as Ireland’s
electoral system has been a debate on some occasions and the decision to retain STV
has been quite deliberate. Most recently in the midst of the 2011 economic crisis, all
Irish political parties included proposals for electoral reform in their manifestos, trying
8Source:https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/2/2c/Thomas wright hill laws 1819.pdf.
retrieved 15 August 2016
9Barber (2000)
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to move voters away from STV, which is perceived to be a “voter-friendly” electoral
system. The Constitutional Convention discussed the matter and recommended keeping
a modified version of the existing STV, showing a trend towards a personalized electoral
system.
2.7.1 Definition
According to the Oxford Advanced American Dictionary, Oxford University Press, STV
is defined as10:
An electoral system of proportional representation in which a person’s vote
can be transferred to a second or further competing candidate (according to
the voter’s stated order of preference) if the candidate of the first choice is
eliminated during a succession of counts or has more votes than are needed
for election.
STV is an iterative procedure. At the beginning of each iteration, the number of first-
place votes is counted. The candidates with total first place votes equaling or exceeding
the quota wins the election, and any excess votes are redistributed proportionally to the
second preferences. If no candidate is reaching the quota, then the candidate with the
least first votes will be eliminated and his votes are distributed to the next preferences.
Quota can be re-evaluated for each iteration, which is called “dynamic STV” (Wallis,
2014). However, the process of re-evaluation is not significant because the re-evaluation
neither increase nor decrease the quota more than one(Aleskerov and Karpov, 2013).
In the STV system, voters supply preference profiles of approved candidates. Voters
could omit candidates at the bottom of preference tables, or leave some candidates
unranked, but we only consider the full preference profiles in this thesis. Ranking a
complete set of candidates is not difficult or demanding when we examine the electorates
with a small number of candidates.
10Source:https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/single transferable vote, re-
trieved 5 July 2016
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In general, a quota is calculated depending on the number of voters and the number
of seats to be filled. The Hare quota used to be applied for STV with the idea of taking
the integer part of the ratio between the number of votes and the number of seats b v
k
c,
where v denotes the number of valid votes and k denotes the number of vacancies to
be filled. In 1881, the Droop quota was proposed, which is defined as b v
k+1
c + 1, the
smallest number to ensure that no more candidates can reach the quota than the number
of vacancies to be filled. Although the Droop quota can create a situation where majority
coalition achieves fewer seats than a minority, it remains the most common quota used
for STV (Tideman, 1995).
The choice of quota could have significant impacts on the election outcomes (Tideman,
1995). Take for example the situation where we need to select three candidates from a
pool of four, two of which are from the Democrats party and the other two are from the
Republican party. There are 100 voters in total with the following voting profile:
24 23 32 21
D E R S
E D S R
R S D E
S R E D
If the Hare quota, which is b100
3
c = 33, is applied, no candidate reaches the quota in
the first iteration. The candidate with the least first place vote, S, will be eliminated,
resulting in the election of D, E and R. However, if the Droop quota, which is b 100
3+1
c+1 =
26 is used, then R wins in the first round. His excess votes (6) will be distributed to the
second preferences S, resulting in the election of S. Therefore, R, S and D will be elected
using the Droop quota.
Although STV can be used to select a single seat or multiple candidates, from now
on we will only consider choosing a single position, which is the focus of this thesis.
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2.7.2 Properties
The complex, shifting behavior of STV with multiple candidates makes STV fail to
possess some desirable properties, notably the IIA and monotonicity.
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
The violation of this property under STV can be best explained in the following example.
Example 4. Consider the situation where we need to elect one position from three
candidates with 9 voters, with preference profile:
3 2 2 2
A B C C
B C A B
C A B A
The Droop quota equals to b 9
1+1
c + 1 = 5. No candidate is winning in the first round
and B is eliminated. His votes are distributed to the second preference resulting in the
election of C.
Now, assume that one voter who has preference ranking A  B  C changes her
mind, placing B above A in the ballot. The new preference profile will be:
2 1 2 2 2
A B B C C
B A C A B
C C A B A
In this case, A is the candidate with the fewest first-place votes and thus eliminated.
A’s votes are distributed to B, resulting in the election of B. Thus, although no voter
changes their ordering of B and C, the election outcome changes.
Negative Responsiveness
Monotonicity means that if one or more voters change their ranked preferences by plac-
ing one candidate higher on preference ranking, then the overall preference list should
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either be changed in favor of that candidate or else be unchanged. In other words, a
candidate cannot be made less popular overall by having more supporters and this is
a desirable property of a voting scheme. Unfortunately, this property of “nonnegative
responsiveness” does not apply to STV. It has been shown that having more voters rank-
ing a candidate as their first preferences could hurt his chance of winning the election
under STV (Tideman, 1995). The following two examples illustrate this point.
Example 5. Assuming that one out of three candidates is to be elected from the fol-
lowing preference profiles:
3 4 3 1
A B C C
B C A B
C A B A
Without any changes, no candidate has the Droop quota of 6. A will be eliminated, and
B wins the election. However, if the last voter with preference C  B  A happens to
ranks B over C, then in the first round, B gets 5 first place votes when A and C ties.
There is a positive probability that A remains and C is eliminated. In that case, the
votes from C will be transferred to A, resulting in A winning the election.
Example 6. 11 Consider the profile:
1 4 6 5
A A B C
B C C A
C B A B
No candidate meets the Droop quota of 9 in the first round. A and C are both eliminated,
B wins the election. Now, if the first voter with preference A  B  C were to promote
B to first place, resulting in the profile:
11adapted fromWallis (2014)
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1 4 6 5
B A B C
A C C A
C B A B
A would be eliminated, and C beats B by 9-7.
Hence, a voter giving more support to a candidate under STV can actually lower his
chance of winning the election. Wallis (2014) proves that under STV, examples that do
not involve a tie will leave a probability on the outcome in the second round. Otherwise,
it would involve more than one voter having changed their preference rankings. Sten-
sholt (2004) notes that the nonmonotonicity property creates instability in the outcomes
because a voter cannot be sure if ranking her favorite candidate first is the best support
she could make. To keep the weaknesses of election method at a minimum level without
losing too many of its strengths, Stensholt (2004) proposes using “tax cut algorithm12”
on the reversed ballot ranking. The author claims that using tax cut, STV will avoid
eliminations, which is often believed to lead to nonmonotonicity.
2.7.3 Manipulation
Before discussing manipulation under STV, it is necessary to distinguish manipulation
from split-ticket. STV often leads to split-ticket where a voter’s ranking is not structured
by party. Voters can give a second preference to a candidate nominated by a second
party rather than one nominated by the same party. Split-ticket voting is not strategic
voting because STV allows voters to express their preferences over candidates rather
than parties. The election of a candidate is based largely on their campaign for personal
votes, with the party campaign being secondary (Marsh and Plescia, 2016, Marsh, 2007).
The following example illustrates how individual manipulation works under STV.
12Stensholt (2004) defines tax cut tally as “an iterative algorithm that ranks the candidates by letting
each voter transfer the surplus part of the vote from one candidate to the next”. This algorithm takes
into account the voting power of a voter in a specific round under STV.
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Example 7. 13 Assume that we need to select 1 position from 4 candidates in an election
with 7 voters. A candidate needs to obtain b 7
1+1
c+ 1 = 4 to win the election. We start
with the sincere preference profile:
2 1 2 1 2
B B D C C
A D C A D
D A B B A
C C A D B
In this sincere preference profile, A has no first-place votes so A will be eliminated first,
resulting in profile:
2 1 2 1 2
B B D C C
D D C B D
C C B D B
Next, D has the smallest number of first place votes and is eliminated, leaving:
2 1 2 1 2
B B C C C
C C B B B
To this iteration, C gains 5 first place votes and wins the election.
Now suppose that one voter, the manipulator, changes the ballot from B  A  D 
C to D  A  B  C. The insincere profile is:
1 1 1 2 1 2
B D B D C C
A A D C A D
D B A B B A
C C C A D B
Again A is eliminated first, leaving:
13adapted from (Wallis, 2014, p.37)
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1 1 1 2 1 2
B D B D C C
D B D C B D
C C C B D B
In the next round, B has the fewest first-place votes and thus, is eliminated:
1 1 1 2 1 2
D D D D C C
C C C C D D
D is elected with 4 first place votes, which makes the manipulator better off. We say
that the election has been manipulated successfully. By the following, we will highlight
literature regarding whether or not it is easy for an individual to manipulate the election
outcome under STV.
Despite exhibiting both inconsistency if the agenda changes in the sense that an intro-
duction of a new candidate would change the relative ranking of former candidates and
nonmonotonicity, existing literature has given enormous support to STV. It is believed
that not only does STV keep the number of wasted votes to a minimum and equally
take into account the opinions of each voter, but it also avoids the incentive to distort
real preferences, encouraging voters to honestly rank candidates in the way they wish
(Tideman, 1995).
The manipulability of STV has often been studied using the computational complexity
approach. STV is one of the very first rules shown to be hard-to-manipulate (NP-
complete). Bartholdi III and Orlin (1991) study STV with both the number of candidates
and the number of voters unbounded using the computational effort approach. They
demonstrate that it is NP-complete under STV to find an “Effective Preference” or
a “Preferred Outcome” where a manipulator can have their more preferred candidate
elected compared to voting honestly. According to Bartholdi III and Orlin (1991), despite
the fact all voting schemes with more than two candidates are manipulable, for some like
STV it is infeasible to do so.
The relationship between manipulability and the number of voters as well as the num-
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ber of candidates has been studied for STV. Walsh (2010) studies different distributions
of votes. It is shown that with the simplest IC condition, the probability that an agent
can manipulate the outcome decreases as the number of agents or number of candidates
gets larger. In other words, the individual manipulability is only significant when the
number of voters and the number of candidates are small. Subsequently, the study is
extended to consider the case when votes are correlated and drawn from an urn model
to find that the cost of computing an individual manipulation increases exponentially
with the number of candidates. However, if the number of candidates is fixed at some
different values up to 64, finding an individual manipulation or proving its nonexistence
is relatively easy. Furthermore, for coalitional manipulation, the chance to successfully
manipulate the election increases with the size of coalition.
Conitzer et al. (2007) find STV to be NP-complete when the number of candidates is
equal to or greater than three, for both constructive and destructive manipulations. The
authors first establish the results for constructive coalitional weighted manipulation in the
complete information setting. They then prove that hardness of coalitional manipulation
with complete information implies hardness of individual unweighted manipulation in the
incomplete information setting. In other words, a constructive individual unweighted
manipulation under uncertainty is NP-complete for STV even with three candidates.
Furthermore, although STV has an undesirable property of being negative responsive
or nonmonotonic, it is also NP-complete to recognize nonmonotonicity in STV elections.
Even better than that, this undesirable property of negative responsiveness can be con-
sidered as a factor that contributes to the hardness to manipulate of STV because to
help a candidate win, a manipulator might have to rank that candidate later (not the
first) in the preference order (Chamberlin, 1985). The difficult-to-manipulate under STV
compared to other voting schemes is quite robust to some restrictive assumptions such
as allowing for voters to learn about the preferences of others. This difficulty holds for
all variants of STV which differ mostly in the way excess votes are reallocated to the
next preferences (Chamberlin, 1985, Bartholdi III and Orlin, 1991).
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However, the computational complexity approach has been challenged. NP-hardness
only bounds for the worst-case complexity (Walsh, 2010). Using a real world sample
analysis, Walsh (2010) concludes that although STV is computationally difficult to ma-
nipulate, manipulation can be relatively easy in practice. Theoretical papers including
Conitzer and Sandholm (2006), Friedgut et al. (2008) show manipulation is often easy
in practice despite NP-hardness. The results raise the concern if the computational
complexity is really the shield against manipulation for the STV rule.
In conclusion, current literature suggests that scoring rules including Plurality, Anti-
plurality and Borda Count are particularly susceptible to manipulation while STV is
found hard to manipulate, removing the need for strategic voting and ensuring the elected
candidates to reflect the diverse views of voters. We can now compute the exact manipu-
lability of four voting rules and see if our results are consistent with those using different
approaches.
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Chapter 3
Model
To keep this chapter relatively self-contained, we start with the Preliminaries section, in-
troducing the notations and redefining necessary concepts in mathematical terms. The
regions where an individual can manipulate election outcome under each of four vot-
ing rules can then be defined. The chapter concludes with the general method used
to compute the volume of convex regions in high dimensional space, with appropriate
adjustment to our regions of interest.
3.1 Preliminaries
The formal definitions are first introduced in general forms for any finite number of
alternatives and then delineated to four voting rules in a specific three-candidate elec-
tion setting. The ideas are taken from Mas-Colell et al. (1995) and Taylor (2005) with
adaptation to the new set of notations.
3.1.1 Basic setting
We consider the situation where a setK of voters (agents) need to make a collective choice
from a set X of m candidates (alternatives). A voter k expresses a strict, complete and
transitive preference ranking over candidates. This linear preference relation over the
set of candidates, often called ballot, reflects some aspect of a voter’s opinion about the
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desirability of different candidates. However, a ballot is just a voter’s ordinal preference
ordering which neither reflects the intensity between candidates nor describes how much
a voter likes a particular candidate. The set of preference relations  on X is denoted
R. We also designate the subset of R that consists of strict preference relations (no two
distinct alternatives are indifferent for ) as P.
Definition 1. Given any subset A ⊂ RK , a social choice function f : A → X de-
fined on A assigns a chosen element f(1, · · · ,K) ∈ X to every profile of individual
preferences in A .
A social choice function (resolute voting rule or simply, voting rule) differs from a
social choice correspondence (non-resolute voting rule) in the sense that a social choice
correspondence outputs a subset of the candidates, allowing for the tie situations; while
for social choice function, the outcome is a single element of X1. In this thesis, we only
focus on social choice functions, and for the sake of simplicity, we often call them voting
rules.
Definition 2. The social choice function f : A → X defined on A ⊂ RK is monotonic
if for any two profiles (1, · · · ,K) ∈ A , (′1, · · · ,′K) ∈ A with the property that
the chosen alternative x = f(1, · · · ,K) maintains its position from (1, · · · ,K) to
(′1, · · · ,′K), we have that f(′1, · · · ,′K) = x.
The social choice function is monotonic if an alternative can only be deselected by
having some agents lowering their rankings for that candidate. As discussed in Chapter
2, our three scoring rules are monotonic while STV is not.
Definition 3. The social choice function f : A → X defined on A ⊂ RK is dictatorial
if there exists an agent h ∈ K, the dictator, such that for every profile (1, · · · ,K) ∈
A , f(1, · · · ,K) ∈ {x ∈ X : x h y for every y ∈ X}.
The dictatorial social choice function always selects the dictator’s most preferred al-
ternative. Obviously, there is no point wasting time to vote if a dictatorial social choice
1In practice, elections involve various tie-breaking rules but here we disregard such complications.
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function is in use because we just need the dictator to determine the outcome.
3.1.2 The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
We assume that each agent k has private information about her own types, which is θk
that affects her decision. All the possible preference relations over X of agent k make
up the set Rk = {k:k=k (θk) for some θk ∈ Θk} with Θk denotes the set of all
possible types of agent k. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem2 is stated as:
Theorem 1. (The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem) Suppose thatX is finite and contains
at least three elements, that Rk = P for all k, and that f(Θ) = X. Then the social
choice function f(.) is truthfully implementable in dominant strategies if and only if it
is dictatorial.
In this context, a social choice function is constructed as a game form where players
are voters and player’s strategies are the set of all possible orderings of preferences over
the set of alternatives. A social choice function is said to be immune to manipulation
if each voter has a strategy that will be at least as good as any other no matter what
any other voter does, called the dominant strategy. Otherwise, a voter might have the
incentive to depart from her actual preference to obtain a more favorable outcome.
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem is restricted to social choice function and the
finiteness of the set X. However, it has been shown that the result applies even without
these requirements (Mas-Colell et al., 1995). As our four voting rules are social choice
functions, and we are considering the case of three-candidate elections which well satisfy
the original Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem; we do not delineate in the expansion of the
theorem.
2The proof of this theorem can be found in Mas-Colell et al. (1995) or Benoıt (2000).
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3.1.3 Definitions of four voting rules
Scoring rules
Plurality, Anti-plurality and Borda Count belong to the class of scoring rule which assigns
scores to each candidate using a weight vector ~α = 〈α1, · · · , αm〉. A candidate receives
α1 points if ranked first, α2 points if ranked second, etc. for every preference ranking in
a ballot. The candidate with the highest total number of points wins the election.
Plurality is the most common scoring rule with ~α = 〈1, 0, · · · , 0〉; Anti-plurality is
the scoring voting rule with the score vector ~α = 〈1, · · · , 1, 0〉; and Borda Count is the
scoring rule which uses the weight vector ~α = 〈1, m−2
m−1 ,
m−3
m−1 , · · · , 0〉.
Single Transferable Vote
Our final voting rule is essentially a “runoff system” which is based on the idea of itera-
tively eliminating the least preferred alternatives. We repeatedly use a single procedure
to the same set of voters but with fewer and fewer alternatives remaining until a single
candidate is left.
STV proceeds through a series of m − 1 rounds. The candidate with the lowest
plurality score is eliminated in each round and each of the votes for that candidate is
transferred to the next remaining candidate in the order given in the ballot. The winner
is the last remaining candidate.
Four voting rules in three-candidate elections
We wish to consider elections with three candidates, denoting A,B, and C. There are
6 possible preference rankings (indexed j) from which a voter can choose. Let aj be
the number of voters who have j preference ranking. Table 3.1 represents six possible
rankings for the three-candidate elections.
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a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6
A A B B C C
B C A C A B
C B C A B A
Table 3.1: Preference ranking in three-candidate elections
A profile is a 6-tuple P = (a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6) of non-negative integers such that∑6
j=1 aj = a provides information about the number of voters in each preference ranking.
Table 3.2 summarizes the information needed for candidate A to be elected in each of
three scoring rules.
Table 3.2: How a candidate wins in three-candidate scoring rules
Voting rule A beats B A beats C
Plurality a1 + a2 > a3 + a4 a1 + a2 > a5 + a6
Anti-plurality a4 + a6 < a2 + a5 a4 + a6 < a1 + a3
Borda count a1 + a2 +
1
2
(a3 + a5) > a3 + a4 +
1
2
(a1 + a6) a1 + a2 +
1
2
(a3 + a5) > a5 + a6 +
1
2
(a2 + a4)
For A to win under STV, we need A to go into the the second round (the runoff). Without
loss of generality, we can assume that B beats C in the first round and loses to A in the
runoff. This means that C has fewest first-place vote, i.e. a1 + a2 > a5 + a6, a3 + a4 >
a5 + a6; and after the first-place votes for C are redistributed to A and B, the total
number of votes for A is greater than that of B, i.e. a1 + a2 + a5 > a3 + a4 + a6.
3.2 Geometrization
3.2.1 Normalized profiles
We divide the number of votes in each preference ranking by the total number of agents
a to obtain a normalized profile p = (p1, p2, p3, p4, p5, p6) where pj = aj/a represents the
fractions of voters who prefer the j preference ranking. Table 3.3 updates the possible
rankings under a normalized profile case for a three-candidate election.
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p1 p2 p3 p4 p5 p6
A A B B C C
B C A C A B
C B C A B A
Table 3.3: Possible rankings under normalized profiles
Because pj ≥ 0 and
∑6
1 pj = 1, the normalized profiles are in a 5 regular simplex in
R6. The entire region ∆5 in R6 is defined as:
∆5 = {p : pj ≥ 0,
6∑
j=1
pj = 1}.
We are considering individual manipulations with large electorates; hence, the contri-
bution of one voter is very tiny. For a voter to successfully change the election outcome
only by changing her own preference, the sincere profiles and the strategic profiles must
be close to the boundary. Without loss of generality, we need to consider the situation
where A and B tie and a voter who most prefers C can manipulate the outcome. Under
the AIC assumption3, the probability that a voter who most prefers C can manipulate
the election by changing her preference ranking is measured by the volume of the region
defined by a set of equalities and inequalities. In the following sections, we sequentially
define the regions Q’s that represent individual manipulation of four voting rules: Plu-
rality, Anti-plurality, Borda Count and STV. We also identify vector of changes ~d of
possible manipulations for each voting rule. The degree of successful individual manip-
ulation under each voting rule will be the multiplication of Q with sinω, where ω is the
angle of region Q with the vector of changes ~d.
3This assumption is often criticized for being unrealistic. For example, the voting situation of
(0,0,1) should not be considered as likely as (0.4,0.5,0.1). However, we have provided valid arguments
for continuing research with this assumption in Chapter 2.
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3.2.2 Plurality
An individual can manipulate the election outcome under Plurality when we have two
leading candidates tie. Individuals who most prefer the third candidate can switch their
votes to either one of two leading candidates and thus, determine the winner. The
individual manipulability is measured as the volume of region Qplu such that:
Qplu = {p ∈ ∆5; p1 + p2 = p3 + p4 > p5 + p6}.
As can be seen from Table 3.3, the first possible manipulation over Qplu is for individuals
who have sincere preferences C  A  B to report A  C  B. This insincere ballot,
causing an increase in p2 simultaneously with a decrease in p5, will lead to the election
of A. We have the first vector of changes ~d1plu = 〈0, 1, 0, 0,−1, 0〉.
The second possible manipulation over Qplu is for individuals who have sincere pref-
erences C  B  A to report B  C  A. This insincere, causing an increase in p4
simultaneously with a decrease in p6, will lead to the election of B. We have the second
vector of changes ~d2plu = 〈0, 0, 0, 1, 0,−1〉.
3.2.3 Anti-plurality
In Anti-plurality voting, each voter votes against a single candidate and the candidate
with the fewest last-place votes wins the election. Anti-plurality in three-candidate
elections is the scoring voting rule with the score vector ~α = 〈1, 1, 0〉. The total number
of votes against A,B,C are p4 + p6, p2 + p5, p1 + p3 respectively. When A and B tie,
i.e: p4 + p6 = p2 + p5; and C is the least preferred candidate, i.e: p1 + p3 > p2 + p5, a
voter who ranks C last can manipulate the outcome by belying the preference as it is
different from the sincere one. Thus, the situation when an individual can manipulate
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Anti-plurality is defined as:
Qant = {p ∈ ∆5; p4 + p6 = p2 + p5 < p1 + p3}.
Specifically, a voter currently in p1 can report A  C  B, resulting in A winning the
election. This possible manipulation can be represented by vector of changes ~d1ant =
〈−1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0〉. The second possible manipulation is for those who have the sincere
preferences B  A  C to report B  C  A, resulting in B winning the election.
This manipulation is characterized by vector of changes ~d2ant = 〈0, 0,−1, 1, 0, 0〉. It is
worth noticing that individuals who constitute p1 and p3 already have their preferred
candidates on the top of ranking preferences, they do not have incentive to change their
preference rankings.
3.2.4 Borda Count
We consider Borda Count in three-candidate elections with the most commonly studied
scoring vector ~α = 〈1, 1
2
, 0〉. The total score for A,B and C are p1 + p2 + 12(p3 + p5),
p3 + p4 +
1
2
(p1 + p6), and p5 + p6 +
1
2
(p2 + p4) respectively. The region of individual
manipulation under Borda Count is defined by:
Qbor = {p ∈ ∆5; p1+p2+1
2
(p3+p5) = p3+p4+
1
2
(p1+p6); p1+p2+
1
2
(p3+p5) > p5+p6+
1
2
(p2+p4)}.
There are four possible manipulations under Borda Count. Firstly, a voter with ranking
C  A  B in p5 can report A  C  B or A  B  C. Because we are considering
scoring vector α = 〈1, 1
2
, 0〉, changing to A  B  C will add the same score to both A
and B and thus will not change the outcome. Only the insincere preference A  C  B
(instead of the true C  A  B) induces a better outcome for the manipulator where A
wins the election instead of B. This possible manipulation is characterized by the vector
of changes ~d1bor = 〈0, 1, 0, 0,−1, 0〉.
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Secondly, a voter who is currently in group p1 with sincere ranking A  B  C can
enhance the chance of winning for A by reporting A  C  B. The vector of changes
~d2bor = 〈−1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0〉 represents this manipulation opportunity.
Thirdly, an individual who has the true preference C  B  A can report B  C  A,
resulting in B winning the election. This manipulation is characterized by the vector of
changes ~d3bor = 〈0, 0, 0, 1, 0,−1〉.
Finally, a voter with sincere preference B  A  C can report B  C  A on the
ballot, resulting in the election of B. This situation is characterized by the vector of
changes ~d4bor = 〈0, 0,−1, 1, 0, 0〉.
3.2.5 Single Transferable Vote
With STV, the way to manipulate is to change who gets into the runoff. Assume that
C would lose a runoff to A, someone who does not like A can manipulate by placing B
at the top of the ballot, even though C is their most preferred candidate, if doing so
creates a runoff between A and B that B would win. Because we consider the situation
where an individual can manipulate the outcome by letting B or C go into the runoff,
this essentially means that B and C tie in the first round. The region of interest Qstv is
defined by:
Qstv = {p ∈ ∆5; p1 + p2 + p3 > p4 + p5 + p6; p1 + p2 + p5 < p3 + p4 + p6; p3 + p4 = p5 + p6}.
There is only one possible manipulation under STV. We know that if C goes into the
runoff, then A would win the election. Therefore, individual who likes B more than A,
having preference C  B  A, has incentive to report B  C  A to help B go into the
runoff. This changes is characterized by the vector ~dstv = 〈0, 0, 0, 1, 0,−1〉.
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3.3 Volume of Convex Region
The volume of a convex region is analytically measured using the decomposition method
and double checked by simulated data. To perform the decomposition method, we first
determine the coordinates of vertices that define each convex region Q. After that, we
discuss how to decompose Q to reduce its dimension so that we can use the available
techniques for computing its volume. The concept of “Singular Value Decomposition”
can be applied to double check the 3D volume computation. As far as we know, the
interpretation of “Singular Value Decomposition” as the volume in high dimensional
space is new. It has an advantage that allows us to compute subvolume even in the case
the original region collapses into smaller dimensional space. Appendix A provides an
introduction into Singular Value Decomposition. This section concludes by introducing
the method of computing the distance from a point to a subspace that is structured by
some hyperplanes, which is an integral part of computing the convex volumes.
3.3.1 Decomposition
One method to measure the volume of a convex region is to break it into smaller pieces,
whose volumes can be computed more readily, and then add up the results. In our case,
the constraint sets are all convex, and it is well known that the intersection of convex
sets is convex, thus the decomposition method is applicable. For each region, we start
by selecting one of its vertices to act as the apex. The volume of region Q can be
decomposed into a collection of pyramids sharing the same apex with different faces of
the region as their bases. The volume of the apex with the base that contains the apex
will be zero, so we only need to consider the faces that do not contain the selected vertex.
When choosing a vertex to act as the apex, we pick the one that belongs to as many
faces as possible. The fewer faces that contain the apex, the less volume computation
44
3.3. VOLUME OF CONVEX REGION
involved. Figure 3.1 4 illustrates this decomposition method in 3D.
Figure 3.1: Partitioning the cube into three square pyramids and then, each
square pyramid is partitioned into triangular pyramid in one of two ways.
3.3.2 Finding coordinates of vertices
We need to define the region of interest by identifying its vertices. The vertices in
6-dimensional spaces have to be the intersection of at least 6 hyperplanes which corre-
4Source:http://mathoverflow.net/questions/190686/what-is-the-number-of-
equitriangulations-of-the-n-cube, retrieved 31 August 2016.
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sponding to 6 equalities. In our studies, the regions of interests are always defined by a
set of 2 equalities. At a vertex, the defining inequalities that are satisfied with equality
determine the vertex. Therefore, we look at all subsets of the set of defining inequali-
ties that might determine a vertex. If a subset is linearly independent and the point it
determines satisfies all the other inequalities, then it constitutes a vertex of region Q.
Take for example the regionQplu. Out of 7 inequalities (pi ≥ 0 and p1+p2 > p5+p6), we
select a combination of four inequalities. There are
(
7
4
)
= 7!
4!(7−4)! = 35 such combinations
but only those that are linearly independent with the existing 2 equalities can create
vertices. The solutions of linear system consisting of these four additional equalities,
together with: p1 + p2 + p3 + p4 + p5 + p6 = 1 and p1 + p2 = p3 + p4 are the coordinates
of the vertices of 4-dimensional region Qplu.
3.3.3 Projection
The volume of a pyramid in dimension n can be measured by 1
n
V h where V is the (n−1)
dimensional volume of the base, and h is the height from the apex to the base. Because
our regions of interest are defined by 2 equalities in a 6-dimensional space, we only need
to restrict our attention to volumes in 4D with 3D bases. The bases are faces of a convex
object so are themselves convex, which allows us to compute their volumes by breaking
them into 3D pyramids and adding up the results. This section explains the general
approach to computing 3D volume bases that applies to vertices with any numbers of
coordinates.
Let ~a,~b,~c be three vectors created from four vertices in a 3-dimensional space. We
can think of this as a 3D pyramid over a 2D face and hence, we can apply exactly the
same method detailed above. To compute the area of the triangle formed by vector ~a
and ~b, let ~e1 be the unit vector in the direction of ~a, and ~e2 be the unit vector in the
direction of ~b− (~b.~e1)~e1. Then, ~e1 and ~e2 are orthogonal unit vectors that span the plane
containing vector ~a and ~b. We can compute the area of the triangle by using ~a.~e1 as the
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base and ~b.~e2 as the height. The area of the triangle will be
1
2
(~a.~e1)(~b.~e2).
To measure the volume of a pyramid over this triangle and vector ~c, let ~e3 be the
unit vector in the direction of ~c − (~c.~e1)~e1 − (~c.~e2)~e2. This determines an orthonormal
basis for the three-space containing the pyramid. The process of finding orthonormal
basis is often refered to as “Gram-Schmidt process”. The height of the apex is ~c.~e3.
Then, we can compute the volume of the pyramid by using the area of the triangle as
the base and ~c.~e3 as the height. The volume of the pyramid will be
1
3
1
2
(~a.~e1)(~b.~e2)(~c.~e3) =
1
6
(~a.~e1)(~b.~e2)(~c.~e3).
3.3.4 Distance from a point to a facet
Apart from computing the bases, we also need to determine the distance from the apex
to the bases. If the base is defined by just one hyperplane, we simply apply the standard
distance formula from one point to a hyperplane given in Appendix B. However, in our
analysis, these bases are not simple hyperplanes with one parametric equation. They are
the intersection of many hyperplanes. In 3D, we can imagine this as an analogy of the
distance from a point to a line, which is illustrated in Figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2: Distance from point A to the line that is the intersection of two planes,
we find the parametric equation of a third plane that passes through A and takes the
position vector of the line as its normal vector. Point B is the intersection of 3 planes.
The distance from A to the line is the length AB.
We apply similar approach when our base is the intersection of k hyperplanes. We start
47
3.3. VOLUME OF CONVEX REGION
by forming a matrix that contains the normal vectors of each hyperplane corresponding
to the equalities. Subsequently, we find the Null Space of that matrix 5. Each vector
in this Null Space will be a normal vector of one additional hyperplane that determines
the projection B of the apex A. The parametric equation of remaining hyperplanes
that determine the point B is ready to be constructed, using the normal vector and the
coordinates of a point it passes through (the apex A). These new hyperplanes, together
with the original k hyperplanes will form a system of 6 equalities and the solutions of
this system are the coordinates of B. The distance from A to k hyperplanes is equal to
the length of AB.
3.3.5 Angle of possible manipulation with the region Q
Let ω be the angle of Q with possible manipulation, which is represented by a vector
of changes, ~d. Successful individual manipulation will be determined by Qsinω as rep-
resented in Figure 3.3. Denote ϕ as the angle between the vector of changes ~d with
the normal vector ~n of the hyperplane that determines the possible manipulation. For
example in the case of Plurality, the hyperplane is p1 +p2 = p3 +p4 and thus, the normal
vector ~nplu = 〈1, 1,−1,−1, 0, 0〉. From Figure 3.3, we can see that sinω = |cosϕ|. There-
fore, it is possible to directly compute Q|cosϕ| as the degree of successful manipulation
where:
cosϕ =
~d.~n
‖~d‖‖~n‖ .
5Null Space of matrix C is N(C) = {~x ∈ Rn|C~x = ~0}
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Figure 3.3: Qsinω or Q|cosϕ| represents the degree of successful manipulation.
49
Chapter 4
Results and Discussion
In this chapter, the main results of four voting rules are presented, followed by a con-
sistency check using simulated data. The chapter closes by discussing the implication of
the results with respect to the existing literature.
4.1 Results
We first provide the general picture of the region Q for each voting rule, including its
vertices and the shapes of its faces1. To compute the volume, we specify a decomposition
structure for each region. The volume results are presented with more details under
Plurality just to give a clearer view of our approach. The same procedure applies to
other voting rules.
4.1.1 Plurality
Vertices
The 12 vertices that define the convex hull Qplu in 4-dimensional space are:
1Obtaining an illustration of the whole region Q would be challenging because human being is still
having difficulties visualizing objects in more than three dimensions. Although we have successfully
formed the Plurality region, we do not yet know how to project 4D objects into 3D in general for other
regions because of their complexity.
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v13 = (
1
2
, 0,
1
2
, 0, 0, 0)
v14 = (
1
2
, 0, 0,
1
2
, 0, 0)
v23 = (0,
1
2
,
1
2
, 0, 0, 0)
v24 = (0,
1
2
, 0,
1
2
, 0, 0)
v315 = (
1
3
, 0,
1
3
, 0,
1
3
, 0)
v415 = (
1
3
, 0, 0,
1
3
,
1
3
, 0)
v316 = (
1
3
, 0,
1
3
, 0, 0,
1
3
)
v416 = (
1
3
, 0, 0,
1
3
, 0,
1
3
)
v325 = (0,
1
3
,
1
3
, 0,
1
3
, 0)
v425 = (0,
1
3
, 0,
1
3
,
1
3
, 0)
v326 = (0,
1
3
,
1
3
, 0, 0,
1
3
)
v426 = (0,
1
3
, 0,
1
3
, 0,
1
3
).
Faces
The region Qplu has seven faces of Qplu which are P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, P6 and H
plu
2 (the
bounding hyperplane corresponding to p1 + p2 > p5 + p6). As can be seen from Figure
4.1, faces P1, P2, P3, and P4 have prismatic forms, each containing six vertices while faces
P5 and P6 are similar, each containing eight vertices. The face H
plu
2 is a hypercube as
illustrated in Figure 4.2.
(a) P1, P2, P3, P4 (b) P5, P6
Figure 4.1: Qplu faces: P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, P6
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Figure 4.2: Qplu faces: Hplu2
Decomposition
Let H be the hyperplane corresponding to p1 + p2 + p3 + p4 + p5 + p6 = 1; H
plu
1 be the
hyperplane corresponding to p1 + p2 = p3 + p4; and H
plu
2 be the bounding hyperplane
corresponding to p1 + p2 > p5 + p6. The vertices v24 is chosen the be the apex and the
region Qplu is then decomposed into a collection of pyramids having v24 as the apex and
the faces that do not contain v24 as bases. There are three bases: P4, P2 and H
plu
2 . Figure
4.3 shows the decomposition structure of Qplu.
v24
v315
P5
P3
P1Hplu2
v315
P5
P3
P2
v315
P5
P1
P4
v325v
4
25v
3
26v
4
26
v415v
4
16v
4
25v
4
26
v316v
4
16v
3
26v
4
26
v316v13v14v
4
16
v14v
4
15v
4
16
v316v13v23v
3
26
v325v
3
26v23
Figure 4.3: The left-most vertex in the diagram is the apex of 3 pyramids
that form the region Qplu. The 3-dimensional bases of these pyramids are
divided into a number of pyramids with apexes given by the second column in
the diagram. Vertices in each bases are listed on the right.
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Volume
As can be seen from the decomposition structure Figure 4.3, we need to compute volumes
of three pieces from the apex v24 to three bases: P4, P2 and H
plu
2 .
Volume of the Base in P4
There are 6 vertices in this base which are v13, v23, v
3
15, v
3
16, v
3
25 and v
3
26. We select the
vertex v315 for further decomposition. There are two faces that do not contain v
3
15 vertex
which are P1 and P5. Of 6 vertices above, there are 3 belong to P1 and 4 belong to
P5. The volume of the region formed by v
3
15 and P1 is
√
14
324
. The volume of the region
formed by v315 and v
3
16, v13, v23 in P5 is
√
14
216
. The volume of the region formed by v315 and
v316, v
3
26, v23 in P5 is
√
14
324
. Thus, the volume of the base P4 is equal to
7
√
14
648
.
Volume of the Base in P2
There are 6 vertices in this base which are again decomposed using v315 as the apex. The
volume of the region formed by apex v315 with P3 equal to
√
14
324
. The volume of the region
formed by v315 with P5 equal to
√
14
216
+
√
14
324
. Thus, the volume of the base in P2 is also
7
√
14
648
.
Volume of the Base in Hplu2
There are 8 vertices of region Qplu that satisfy the equation of hyperplane Hplu2 . To
measure the volume of the convex hull in the base Hplu2 , we again apply the decomposition
method, choosing v315 as the apex. There are 3 faces that do not contain this v
3
15 apex,
which are P1, P3 and P5. There are four vertices in each of this hyperplane and they are
linearly dependent. Thus, we can break it into two 3D pyramids and add up the results.
The volume of the base in Hplu2 equals to
2
√
2
27
.
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Distance from apex v24 to each base
We illustrate here the process of measuring distance from apex v24 to face P2. Let matrix
M consists of all the coefficients of three equalities that satisfy face P2:
M =

1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 −1 −1 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
 .
The Null Space of M are found to contain three vectors:

−1 0 −1 0 0 2
−1 0 −1 0 2 0
0 0 −1 1 0 0
 .
By using three vectors of the Null Space as the normal vectors, we establish three addi-
tional hyperplanes that pass through the vertex v24:
−p1 − p3 + 2p6 = 0
−p1 − p3 + 2p5 = 0
−p3 + p4 − 1
2
= 0.
These three new hyperplanes, together with the three old ones that define the face P2
form the linear system of 6 equalities. Solving this linear system, we find the point
v∗ = ( 5
14
, 0,− 1
14
, 3
7
, 1
7
, 1
7
). The distance from the apex v24 to the facet P2 is the length
v24v
∗, which equals to
√
3
7
.
Using similar approach, the distance from apex v24 to face P4 is found to be
√
3
7
while
the distance to face Hplu2 is
1
2
√
3
.
In summary, the volume of the region that represent individual manipulation under
Plurality is the sum of three pieces. Two pieces from apex v24 to face P2 and P4, each
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has the volume of 7
432
√
6
. The piece from apex v24 to face H
plu
2 has the volume of
1
54
√
6
.
Thus, the volume of interest is 11
216
√
6
.
Angle of Qplu with possible manipulation and the revised volume
We find cosϕ = 1
2
√
2
for the first possible manipulation with ~d1plu = 〈0, 1, 0, 0,−1, 0〉,
and cosϕ = − 1
2
√
2
for the second possible manipulation with ~d2plu = 〈0, 0, 0, 1, 0,−1〉.
Therefore, the revised volume taking into account the possible manipulation and its
angle under Plurality will be 11
216
√
6
× ( 1
2
√
2
+ 1
2
√
2
) = 11
432
√
3
.
4.1.2 Anti-plurality
Vertices
We find 10 vertices that define the convex hull Qant in 4-dimensional space:
u1 = (1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)
u3 = (0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0)
v356 = (0, 0,
1
3
, 0,
1
3
,
1
3
)
v345 = (0, 0,
1
3
,
1
3
,
1
3
, 0)
v236 = (0,
1
3
,
1
3
, 0, 0,
1
3
)
v234 = (0,
1
3
,
1
3
,
1
3
, 0, 0)
v156 = (
1
3
, 0, 0, 0,
1
3
,
1
3
)
v145 = (
1
3
, 0, 0,
1
3
,
1
3
, 0)
v126 = (
1
3
,
1
3
, 0, 0, 0,
1
3
)
v124 = (
1
3
,
1
3
, 0,
1
3
, 0, 0).
Faces
An illustration of Anti-plurality faces can be seen in Figure 4.4. P1 and P3 have similar
shapes, each containing 5 vertices. P2, P4, P5 and P6 have similar shapes, each containing
6 vertices. Hant2 is a hypercube looks like H
plu
2 in Figure 4.2.
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(a) P1, P3 (b) P2, P4, P5, P6
Figure 4.4: Qant faces
Decomposition
We choose u1 as the apex. Two faces P1 and H
ant
2 : p2 + p5 = p1 + p3 do not contain u1,
thus, are considered as the bases. The decomposition is presented in Figure 4.5.
u1
v356
P6
P5
P3
Hant2
u3
Hant2
P1
v345v
1
45v
1
24
v236v
1
26v
1
24
v156v
1
45v
1
26v
1
24
v356v
3
45v
2
36
Figure 4.5: Qant decomposition structure
There are 5 vertices in P1 which are u3, v
3
56, v
3
45, v
3
36 and v
2
34. Within P1, we again
choose u3 as the apex for further decomposition. There are only two faces that do not
contain u3 which are P3 and H
ant
2 . However, of the 5 vertices above, none belong to P3
while 4 belongs to Hant2 , which are v
3
56, v
3
45, v
2
36 and v
2
34.
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In Hant2 , there are 8 vertices that form a hypercube. v
3
56 is chosen as the apex for
further decomposition with bases P3, P5 and P6. As shown in Figure 4.5, base P3 contains
4 vertices which are v156, v
1
45, v
1
26 and v
1
24 while P5 and P6 each contains three vertices.
Volume
The volume of the base P1 is
2
√
5
81
with the distance from u1 to P1 equals to
√
6
5
. The
volume of base Hant2 is
2
√
2
27
with the distance from u1 to H
ant
2 equals to
1√
3
. Thus, the
volume of the area interest under Anti-Plurality is
√
6
81
.
Angle of Qant with possible manipulation and the revised volume
We find cosϕ = 1
2
√
2
where ϕ is the angle between the normal vector ~nant = 〈0, 1, 0,−1, 1,−1〉
and the first possible manipulation ~d1ant = 〈−1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0〉. cosϕ = − 12√2 for the sec-
ond possible manipulation with ~d2ant = 〈0, 0,−1, 1, 0, 0〉. Therefore, the revised vol-
ume taking into account the possible manipulation and its angle under Anti-plurality is
√
6
81
× ( 1
2
√
2
+ 1
2
√
2
) =
√
3
81
.
4.1.3 Borda Count
Vertices
We find 8 vertices that define the region of interest under Borda Count rule:
v35 = (0, 0,
1
2
, 0,
1
2
, 0)
v24 = (0,
1
2
, 0,
1
2
, 0, 0)
v13 = (
1
2
, 0,
1
2
, 0, 0, 0)
v16 = (
1
2
, 0, 0, 0, 0,
1
2
)
v145 = (
1
3
, 0, 0,
1
3
,
1
3
, 0)
v23 = (0,
1
3
,
2
3
, 0, 0, 0)
v14 = (
2
3
, 0, 0,
1
3
, 0, 0)
v236 = (0,
1
3
,
1
3
, 0, 0,
1
3
).
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Faces
The region Qbor also has 7 inequalities which define 7 faces. Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.7
illustrate how these faces look like. P1 and P3 have similar shapes, each containing 4
vertices. P2 and P4 have similar shapes, each containing 5 vertices. P5 and P6 have
similar shapes, each containing 6 vertices. Hbor2 contains 5 vertices but its shape is
different from P2 and P4.
(a) P1, P3 (b) P2, P4
Figure 4.6: Qbor faces: P1, P2, P3, P4
(a) P5, P6 (b) H
bor
2
Figure 4.7: Qbor faces P5, P6, H
bor
2
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Decomposition
As being shown in Figure 4.8, v35 is chosen as the apex with bases P3 and P5. There
are four vertices in P3 and v24 is selected as the apex to compute the volume. There are
6 vertices in the base P5 and again v24 is chosen as the apex. The volume in P5 can be
decomposed into volume from apex v24 to face P2 and face P4.
v35
v24
P4
P2
P5
v24
P2
P3
v13v16v
2
3v
2
36
v13v16v
1
4
v16v
1
45v
1
4
Figure 4.8: Qbor decomposition structure
Volume
The base in P3 formed by for vertices v24, v16, v
1
45, v
1
4 has the volume of
1
12
√
6
. The distance
from v35 to P3 is
1√
3
.
In P5, the volume of the region formed by v24 and P2, which includes v13, v16, v
1
4 is
1
8
√
6
.
Because v236−v13 = 32(v16−v13) + (v23−v13), we can break the region formed by the apex
v24 with 4 vertices v13, v16, v
2
3, v
2
36 into two pieces. The one formed by v24 and v13, v16, v
2
36
has the volume of 1
8
√
6
. The other formed by v24 and v13, v
2
3, v
2
36 has the volume of
1
12
√
6
.
Thus, the volume of base P5 is
1
3
√
6
. The distance from v35 to P5 equals to
1√
3
.
In conclusion, the volume of Qbor is the sum of the volume created by v35 and P3, and
the volume formed by v35 and P5, which equals to Q
bor, or 5
144
√
2
.
Angle of Qbor with possible manipulation and the revised volume
With four possible vector of changes under Borda Count and the normal vector ~nbor =
〈1
2
, 1,−1
2
,−1, 1
2
,−1
2
〉, we find that cosϕ = 1
2
√
6
for the first two vector of changes and
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cosϕ = − 1
2
√
6
for vector of changes ~d3bor and ~d4bor. Therefore, the revised volume under
Borda Count is 5
144
√
2
× 4× 1
2
√
6
= 5
144
√
3
.
4.1.4 Single Transferable Vote
Vertices
The 6 vertices defining the region of interest under STV are listed below:
v35 = (0, 0,
1
2
, 0,
1
2
, 0)
v36 = (0, 0,
1
2
, 0, 0,
1
2
)
v246 = (0,
1
2
, 0,
1
4
, 0,
1
4
)
v236 = (0,
1
2
,
1
4
, 0, 0,
1
4
)
v146 = (
1
2
, 0, 0,
1
4
, 0,
1
4
)
v136 = (
1
2
, 0,
1
4
, 0, 0,
1
4
).
Faces
The region Qstv has eight faces. As illustrated in Figure 4.9, P1, P2, P4, H
stv
2 each contains
four vertices while P5, H
stv
3 each contains five vertices. P3 only has two points, which
makes it a line segment; and P6 only has one point.
(a) P1, P2, P4, H
stv
2 (b) P5, H
stv
3
Figure 4.9: Qstv faces
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Decomposition
We choose v35 as the apex for decomposition under STV as presented in 4.10. We then
need to compute the volume in faces that do not contain v35, which are P3 and P5. v36
is chosen as the apex for further decomposition in P5.
v35
v36
Hstv3
P5
v246, v
1
46
P3
v246v
2
36v
1
46v
1
36
Figure 4.10: Qstv decomposition structure
Volume
There are only two vertices in P3, which are v
2
46 and v
1
46. These two vertices do not create
a 3D volume. There are five vertices in P5 that form a region with volume of
√
7
48
√
2
. The
distance from v35 to P5 is
√
3
7
. Thus, the volume of Qstv is 1
64
√
6
.
Angle of Qstv with possible manipulation and the revised volume
With the vector of changes ~dstv = 〈0, 0, 0, 1, 0,−1〉 and normal vector ~nstv = 〈0, 0, 1, 1,−1,−1〉,
we found cosϕ = 1√
2
. Therefore, the revised volume under STV equals to 1
64
√
6
× 1√
2
=
1
128
√
3
.
4.2 Consistency check
In order to double check our complex analytical process, we generate a large number of
points that satisfy all the equalities of each voting rule contained in a hypercube. We
then filter these points into a subset that satisfies the inequalities in addition to the
equalities. The ratio of the number of points in the subset to the number of points in the
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original set is the ratio of the volume formed by all constraints to the volume formed by
equality constraints due to uniform randomization. We are certain that the dimensions
of the two volumes are the same because applying inequalities on linear sets does not
reduce their dimensions.
The volume of a hypercube in n dimensions, or an n cube is straightforward to com-
pute2. With the edge length of r, the volume of an n cube is rn. The intuition behind
this formula is that to construct an n cube, we start with an n − 1 cube and sweep it
through space perpendicular to the hyperplane in which it lies. Figure 4.11 illustrates
this process for the first three dimensions.
Figure 4.11: Constructing a 3-cube: A point at the origin sweeps out a line
segment. The line segment sweeps out a square by moving perpendicularly to
its length. The square sweeps out a cube by moving perpendicularly to its
surface.
Without loss of generality, X is denoted as the matrix that contains all coefficients
of the equalities in each voting rule. With all 4 voting rules in this paper, we have 2
equalities. We then find the Null Space of matrix X and its orthonormal basis. In our
case, the orthonormal basis contains 4 vectors, each with 6 coordinates. The transpose
of the orthonormal basis of X will give us 6 vectors, each with 4 coordinates, from
which we can construct the 4-cube. To have the most efficient cube, we need to select
the center of the cube that is the most symmetric. In our case, we choose the point
T = (1
6
, 1
6
, 1
6
, 1
6
, 1
6
, 1
6
). We also carefully select the edge length of the cube that is as small
as possible but still sufficient for the 4-cube to cover all necessary points. The edge
length is 2R with R chosen to be 0.8.
In the simulation, we first uniformly generate m × i points in a 4-cube, using i iter-
2Source:http://www.physicsinsights.org/hypercubes 1.html, retrieved 16 August 2016
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ations, each of which generates m points. In this paper, we only run simulations with
m = 100, 000 and i = 400 but as is well-known, the greater these values, the more ac-
curate the results. The number of points that satisfy the equalities is denoted as t. We
then use Excel to filter the points that satisfy the inequalities in addition to equalities
(denoted as na)
3. The volume of the region that satisfies the set of equalities is:
Ve =
(2R)4 × t
m× i .
The ratio of the volume of the region that satisfies all inequalities and equalities (denoted
as Vi), to the region that satisfies only the equalities (Ve) is:
Vi
Ve
=
na
t
.
Thus, the volume of our area of interest is:
Vi =
na
t
.
(2R)4 × t
m× i =
(2R)4 × na
m× i .
Appendix C provides a typical code for the approximation of Vi using Mathematica.
4.3 Discussion
Table 4.1 shows that the decomposition method and the method of using simulated data
deliver similar results with tiny errors so we are confident that the volumes have been
precisely measured.
3Ideally, the design of an algorithm that can incorporate such inequalities to filter the points within
Mathematica would significantly reduce the complexity of the process and the computational time.
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Table 4.1: Summary of original volumes and consistency check
Voting Rule Analytical Simulated Error
Plurality 11
216
√
6
(2×0.8)4×126950
100000×400 ≈ 0.020799488 0.0000090
Anti-plurality
√
6
81
(2×0.8)4×184614
100000×400 ≈ 0.03024715776 0.0000065
Borda count 5
144
√
2
(2×0.8)4×149375
100000×400 = 0.0244736 -0.0000787
STV 1
64
√
6
(2×0.8)4×38864
100000×400 ≈ 0.00636747776 -0.0000114
The results for four voting rules, taking into account possible manipulations and its
angle with Q, are summarized in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2: Revised volumes
Voting Rule Revised Volumes
Plurality 11
432
√
3
Anti-plurality
√
3
81
Borda count 5
144
√
3
STV 1
128
√
3
As can be seen from Table 4.1 and Table 4.2, STV is far less susceptible to individual
manipulation compared to three scoring rules and this is consistent with the existing
literature. The resistance of STV to individual manipulation is attributed to the small
defining region of possible manipulation and the existence of only one situation in which
individual manipulation is possible under STV. As the ratios between the probabilities of
individual manipulability under each scoring rule and under STV are computed, we can
see that Plurality is approximately 3.3 times more vulnerable to individual manipulation
than STV. Borda Count is even more vulnerable to individual manipulation, at about
4.4 times easier to be manipulated individually than STV. However, the most vulnerable
rule to individual manipulation is Anti-plurality whose manipulability is about 4.7 times
higher than that of STV.
It is worth noticing that although there are more situations where an individual can
manipulate the election under Borda Count, the angles of such situations with the defin-
ing equality under Borda Count are small, which means that the manipulations have a
low chance of success. Thus, the result suggesting that Borda Count is more susceptible
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to individual manipulation than Anti-plurality is not unexpected. Furthermore, our re-
sult is consistent with Smith (1999) who argues that Plurality is less manipulable than
Borda Count.
Conitzer et al. (2007) suggest two methods to build the complexity in manipulation to
protect the voting system. The first approach is to consider voters with different voting
weights. Although unweighted voters are common, the introduction of weighted voters
can fit the case of heterogenous agents better. For example, the weight can be interpreted
as the size of the community that the voter represents (like a state), the size of the group
(in parliament) or simply as an account of the case when a given agent has different
decision-making power (shareholders in a company). The second approach entails giving
up the complete information assumption by introducing probability distributions on the
non-colluders’ votes and examining if this changes the probability that a given voter
could manipulate the election. It is found that incomplete information about how other
people vote increases the difficulty of manipulation.
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Conclusion
5.1 Summary of findings
The ubiquity of voting systems has made research into voting theory increasingly im-
portant. This thesis is motivated by the lack of analytical results regarding individual
manipulations of voting rules in the existing literature, and the recent unpredictable out-
comes of the UK’s Brexit and the US presidency, taking one step further to demystify a
complex aspect of voting.
In this thesis, we have studied the individual manipulability of four voting rules: Plu-
rality, Anti-plurality, Borda Count and STV in the context of three-candidate elections,
with the IAC assumption when preference profiles are normalized. We have clearly
described how an individual voter can manipulate the outcome under each rule and
computed the volume of the regions representing such situations, taking the angle of the
region with possible manipulation as the adjustment factor.
We find that STV is the least susceptible rule out of the four to individual manipula-
tion and our result is consistent with other research using different approaches. Each of
the three other scoring rules is more vulnerable to individual manipulation than is STV.
Out of the four, Anti-plurality is the most susceptible rule to individual manipulation,
with the likelihood of successful individual manipulation almost five times higher than
that of STV.
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5.2. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Our geometric approach to computing volume has two main advantages. Firstly, we
take into account the angle of the individual manipulability with possible manipulation,
accurately reflecting the likelihood of successful individual manipulation under each vot-
ing scheme. Secondly, the geometric approach allows us to obtain the general results
that hold true for any number of voters. This strengthens our conclusion that STV is
the least susceptible rule to individual manipulation.
5.2 Suggestions for future research
There are two possible extensions of our research. Firstly, for other paradoxical voting
situations, the IAC assumption tends to increase the opportunities of such paradoxes
happening, which draws us to the conclusion that if paradoxes are rare under IAC, we
can say they are not likely to be a real threat. However, the IAC assumption actually
reduces the chance of successful individual manipulations. Instead of exaggerating the
likelihood of manipulation, it understates the probability that such events might be
observed. The reason is because manipulation tends to happen when we have closely
tie situations. Meanwhile, IAC spreads the probability of each voting situation evenly,
giving too much weight on profiles that are actually very unlikely to occur, resulting
in zero probability limit of observing individual manipulation. Therefore, it is worth
considering conducting manipulation research with a more realistic set of assumptions,
which also takes into account domino effects that one voter could have on others.
Although our results are robust to any number of voters, the question remains open
for numbers of candidates greater than or equal to four. Our decomposition method
would become unnecessarily complex with about 24 dimensions in the case of just four
candidates. Therefore, new solutions needed for the general problem with m candidates,
and to show that for all voting rules that satisfy symmetry and unanimity, STV is the
least susceptible rule against individual and coalitional manipulations with any small
number of candidates.
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Appendix A
Singular Value Decomposition
Singular Value Decomposition is one of the most beautiful and useful results from linear
algebra which states that any transformation can be expressed as a rotation followed
by a scaling followed by another rotation. Singular Value Decomposition has the same
idea with diagonalization but in a more general sense that applies not only to square
matrices but also the rectangulars. Recall that an n×n matrix A is diagonalizable if we
can decompose A into:
A = PDP−1
where P is an invertible matrix and D is a diagonal matrix.
The secret to constructing matrix P is to let the columns of P be the eigenvectors of
A. If D is a diagonal matrix with eigenvalues on the diagonal, AP = PD. Because P is
invertible if and only if the columns of P are linearly independent, A is diagonalizable if
and only if A has n linearly independent eigenvectors. We can present P and D in the
following forms:
P =
[
a1 a2 · · · an
]
D =

λ1 0 · · · 0
0 λ2 · · · 0
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
0 · · · 0 λn

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To get the Singular Value Decomposition, we take the advantage of the fact that for any
matrix A, ATA is symmetric and thus, their eigenvectors form an orthonormal basis.
Consider the eigenvectors xi and corresponding eigenvalues λi. Let σi =
√
λi and
ri =
Axi
σi
. Three matrices are constructed from these values. The first one is the diagonal
matrix, or scale matrix, Σ that has σi values on the diagonal (filled by 0 if do not have
enough σs). The other two are the rotation matrix U with ri as columns and the matrix
V with xi as columns. It is proven that UΣV
T = A. We also know that multiplying
eigenvalues of a square matrix gives us its determinant, and the determinant has an
interpretation as the volume of hypercube created by those vectors. It is analogous that
matrix Σ, the 2nd matrix of our Singular Value Decomposition can be used to compute
the volume of the region formed by vectors of matrix A. This conclusion is utilized to
double check all the volume results computed in this paper, in addition to the projection
method.
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Appendix B
Distance from one point to a hyperplane
Given the parametric equation of a hyperplane ap1 + bp2 + cp3 + dp4 + ep5 + fp6 + g = 0
and a point p = (p∗1, p
∗
2, p
∗
3, p
∗
4, p
∗
5, p
∗
6), the normal vector to the plane is given by:
~n = 〈a, b, c, d, e, f〉
A vector from the plane to the point is given by:
~w = −〈p1 − p∗1, p2 − p∗2, p3 − p∗3, p4 − p∗4, p5 − p∗5, p6 − p∗6〉
Projecting ~w onto ~n gives the distance d from the point to the hyperplane:
d =
|~n.~w|
‖~n‖
=
|a(p1 − p∗1) + b(p2 − p∗2) + c(p3 − p∗3) + d(p4 − p∗4) + e(p5 − p∗5) + f(p6 − p∗6)|√
a2 + b2 + c2 + d2 + e2 + f 2
=
|ap1 + bp2 + cp3 + dp4 + ep5 + fp6 − ap∗1 − bp∗2 − cp∗3 − dp∗4 − ep∗5 − fp∗6|√
a2 + b2 + c2 + d2 + e2 + f 2
=
| − g − ap∗1 − bp∗2 − cp∗3 − dp∗4 − ep∗5 − fp∗6|√
a2 + b2 + c2 + d2 + e2 + f 2
=
ap∗1 + bp
∗
2 + cp
∗
3 + dp
∗
4 + ep
∗
5 + fp
∗
6 + g√
a2 + b2 + c2 + d2 + e2 + f 2
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Appendix C
Mathematica Code
C.1 Faces
In our case, all the vertices have 6 coordinates but the faces that form the bases for
volume computation are in 3-dimensional space. To visualize the faces, we bring those
vertices to 3 coordinates points and draw a convex hull formed by them. The following
code is for P1 face under Anti-plurality. To obtain the results for other faces, we only
need to change the vertex coordinates.
ant1 =

0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1
3
0 1
3
1
3
0 0 1
3
1
3
1
3
0
0 1
3
1
3
0 0 1
3
0 1
3
1
3
1
3
0 0

;
a1=With [{ vec to r s=#−First@ant1&/@ant1} ,
N@DeleteCases [ Orthogona l i ze [ v e c t o r s ] ,
{0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0} ] . Transpose [ v e c t o r s ] // Transpose ] ;
ConvexHullMesh [ a1 ]
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C.2. DISTANCE
C.2 Distance
The algorithm to find the distance is designed in accordance with discussion in Section
3.3.4. The following is the code for distance from apex v35 to face P3 under Borda count.
A =

1 1 1 1 1 1
1
2
1 −1
2
−1 1
2
−1
2
0 0 1 0 0 0
 ;
n=NullSpace [A]//MatrixForm
m =

1 1 1 1 1 1
1
2
1 −1
2
−1 1
2
−1
2
0 0 1 0 0 0
−3 2 0 0 0 1
−1 0 0 0 1 0
−4 3 0 1 0 0

;
LinearSolve [m,{1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 / 2 , 0} ]
{1/18 ,0 ,0 ,2/9 ,5/9 ,1/6}
Norm[{0 ,0 ,1/2 ,0 ,1/2 ,0} −LinearSolve [m,{1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1 / 2 , 0} ] ]
1/Sqrt [ 3 ]
C.3 Volume
To compute the volume of a pyramid, we first define three vectors v1, v2, v3 from the coor-
dinates of 4 vertices. Subsequently, unit vectors that form the orthogonal basis e1, e2, e3
are computed. Finally, volume is computed using the formula discussed in Section 3.3.3.
v1 ={1/2 ,0 ,0 ,1/4 ,0 ,1/4} −{0 ,1/2 ,0 ,1/4 ,0 ,1/4} ;
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C.4. SIMULATION
v2 ={1/2 ,0 ,1/4 ,0 ,0 ,1/4} −{0 ,1/2 ,0 ,1/4 ,0 ,1/4} ;
v3 ={0 ,0 ,1/2 ,0 ,0 ,1/2} −{0 ,1/2 ,0 ,1/4 ,0 ,1/4} ;
e1=v1/Norm[ v1 ] ;
e2=(v2−(v2 . e1 ) e1 )/Norm[ ( v2−(v2 . e1 ) e1 ) ] / / Simplify ;
e3=(v3−(v3 . e1 ) e1−(v3 . e2 ) e2 )/Norm[ ( v3−(v3 . e1 ) e1−(v3 . e2 ) e2 ) ] / / Simplify ;
V=1/6 ( v3 . e3 ) ( v1 . e1 ) ( v2 . e2 )// Simplify
Sqrt [ 7 /2 ] /96
C.4 Simulation
The following is the code for consistency check as discussed in Section 4.2 under STV.
f [{ p1 , p2 , p3 , p4 , p5 , p6 } ] :=
I f [ p1>=0&&p2>=0&&p3>=0&&p4>=0&&p5>=0&&p6>=0,
{p1 , p2 , p3 , p4 , p5 , p6 } ]
X =
 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 0 1 1 −1 −1
 ;
n=NullSpace [X ] ;
Q=Orthogona l i ze [ n ] \ [ Transpose ] //N;
m=100000;
xp ={{1/6} ,{1/6} ,{1/6} ,{1/6} ,{1/6} ,{1/6}} ;
c s=RandomVariate [ Uni fo rmDist r ibut ion [{ −1 ,1} ] ,
{m, 4 } ] \ [ Transpose ] ;
XN=Q. cs 0 . 8 ;
xps=Table [{1/6 ,1/6 ,1/6 ,1/6 ,1/6 ,1/6} ,{ i , 1 ,m} ] \ [ Transpose ] ;
G=XN+xps ;
For [ i =1, i <401 , i ++,
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C.4. SIMULATION
cs=RandomVariate [ Uni fo rmDist r ibut ion [{ −1 ,1} ] ,
{m, 4 } ] \ [ Transpose ] ;
XN=Q. cs 0 . 8 ;G=XN+xps ; Gt=G\ [ Transpose ] ;
a [ i ]=DeleteCases [ f /@Gt, Null ] ]
Export [ ” datastv . x l s ” , Flatten [ Array [ a , { 4 0 0 } ] , 1 ] , ”Table” ]
datastv . x l s
SystemOpen [ ” datastv . x l s ” ]
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